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THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN*
The Supreme Court has approved a uniform code of evidence
for all federal courts. Amendments to the Supreme Court's rules
are now pending in the House of Representatives. From the point
of view of a specialist in the law of evidence, Professor Rothstein
analyzes the differences between the Supreme Court's proposals
and the House amendments and suggests solutions to these conflicts.
On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States ap-
proved for use in virtually all federal court proceedings a uniform set of
evidence rules' to take effect July 1, 1973, unless vetoed within 90 days of
transmittal to Congress.2 The rules were the product of seven years of
drafting by a distinguished, Supreme Court-appointed Advisory Com-
mittee,' which in the course of its work produced two well-circulated
drafts4 and received and considered numerous comments from persons
involved in nearly every area of court-related law.
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Author, several books and
articles in the field of evidence; Special Litigation consultant, U.S. Treasury; Reporter,
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
1 Order, 56 F.RD. 183 (1972); see RUrs OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AN
MAGisrRATEs, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRoPosEo FED. R. Evm. (Supreme
Court Draft Nov. 1972) ].
2 The rules were transmitted to Congress on February 5, 1973, and some authorities
believed that, pursuant to the 90-day provisions of the enabling statutes, congressional
power to veto the rules would expire on May 6, 1973, although the rules would be
implemented only as of July 1, 1973. H.R. REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973);
see 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970) (rules governing district court criminal proceedings); 28 id.
§ 2072 (rules governing civil actions); id. § 2075 (rules governing bankruptcy proceed-
ings); cf. 18 id. § 3402 (rules governing criminal proceedings before magistdtes and
appeals therefrom; no provision for congressional consideration).
3 The panel was the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence appointed by the
Chief Justice in March 1965 at the direction of the Judicial Conference. See 28 U.S.C.
§331 (1970). The committee chairman was the well-known Illinois trial attorney and
Warren Commission counsel Albert Jenner, who had participated in drafting the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence as a longtime Commissioner on Uniform State Laws. The panel
also included Judges Simon Sobeloff, Joe Estes, and Robert Van Pelt; Professors (now
federal judges) Jack Weinstein and Charles Joiner; Professor Thomas Green; Herman
Selvin, father of the pioneering California Evidence Code; former chief of the Justice
Department's Criminal Appeals Division, Robert Erdahl; and famed litigators David
Berger, Egbert Haywood, Frank Raichle, Craig Spangenberg, Edward Bennett Williams,
and the late Hicks Epton. The reporter was Professor Edward Cleary.
4 PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.RD. 161 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FED. R. EvnD.
(Prelim. Draft Mar. 1969)]; REvism DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
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Believing 90 days was too short a period in which to consider this
complex and far-reaching body of evidence rules, Congress passed leg-
islation in March 1973 requiring express congressional approval before
the Rules could have any force or effect." Congress believed that an evi-
dence code would affect fundamental matters of civil and criminal
justice that reach beyond technical courtroom conduct and into the lives
of citizens.7 In addition, many lawyers, preferring case-by-case develop-
ment of the law, questioned the desirability of any evidence code.8
On June 28, 1973, after conducting hearings," the House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice proposed amendments
to the Supreme Court Draft.10 While leaving most provisions of the Rules
UNrrED STATES CORTS ANm MAGISTRATES, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROPOSED FED. R. EvrD. (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971)]. A. less-publicized draft was published
informally by the Judicial Conference in October 1971. CoMMITTEE ON RuLEs or PRAArICE
AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF ThE UMTED STATES, PROPOSED Rt.S OF EVIDENCE
(Rev. Draft Oct. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. (Rev. Draft Oct.
1971)].
5 See H.R. RaE. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
1 Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Star. 9.
T See Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subconin. on Re-
form of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 2, at 2 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Hungate) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Proposed
Rules]; id. at 5 (remarks of Rep. Holtzman); id. at 6-8 (testimony of, Rep. Podell); N.Y.
Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 14, col. 2-4. The congressional action no doubt was influenced by
heightened sensitivity in Congress to infringement of its prerogatives by the other
branches of government. Justice Douglas believes, inter alia, that the rules go beyond
mere "procedure" authorized by the enabling legislation. Order, 56 F.RD. 183, 185
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 144 (testimony of Justice
Arthur Goldberg); id. at 200-02, 208-10 (testimony of Robert Clare, Jr.); id. at 214-16
(statement of a committee of New York trial lawyers); id. at 246-65 (testimony and
statement of former Chief Judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit); id. at 219-20 (letter from former Chief Judge Henry Friendly
to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Judicial
Conference, Mar. 31, 1970). Prior to appointment of the Advisory Committee, the de-
sirability of, a unified body of evidence rules for federal courts was indicated by a
study performed for the Judicial Conference. Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisabil-
ity and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts,
30 F.R.D. 79 (1961).
9 Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7.
1 0 SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 1ST
Sass., PROPOSED CHANGES TO Tm RULEs OF EVIDENCE (Comm. Print June 28, 1973) [here-
inafter cited as PROPOSED CHANGES]. The committee amendments, without the notes, have
been published in the Congressional Record. 119 CoNG. REc. H5452 (daily ed. June 26,
1973). The Subcommittee formerly was known as the Special Subcommittee on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws. Despite its name, the Subcommittee's jurisdiction comprises.
both civil and criminal aspects of the rules.
FEDERAL RULES oF EVIDENCE
intact, the amendments contemplate a major change respecting privileges
and less extensive revisions in several other areas. The amendments also
propose a few minor language changes, primarily intended to produce
greater clarity or consistency.11 In many instances the Subcommittee sub-
stantially reverted to positions which had been adopted by the Advisory
Committee in earlier drafts but dropped under pressure from influential
"law and order" proponents.'2 Although the Subcommittee should have
made several additional changes and clarifications not requiring major
policy reconsideration, 3 this article discusses only those rules substantial-
ly affected by the proposed amendments.
11 See, e.g., PaoPosED CuANGEs rule 104, supra note 10, at 6 (absolute right of accused
to have preliminary matters heard out of hearing of jury; not merely "where justice
demands"); id. rule 902(8), at 35 (acknowledgment by a notary, making a document
self-authenticating, must be in "manner provided by law" rather than "under hand and
seal"); id. rule 1001, at 36 ("photographs" broadened expressly to include videotapes).
In addition, several comments of the Subcommittee are significant although no textual
changes would be made. See, e.g., PROPOSED CHANGES rule 405(b), Subcomm. Note, supra
note 10, at 10 (cases will be rare when character truly in issue so as to make evidence of
specific conduct admissible); id. rule 902(9), Subcomm. Note, at 35 (specifies what is
meant by "the general commercial law" making commercial paper self-authenticating);
id. rule 1003, Subcomm. Note, at 36 (courts should be persuaded easily that a "genuine
issue" concerning authenticity exists so that duplicates may not come in easily); id. rule
1004, Subcomm. Note, at 37 (for purposes of best evidence rule, documents lost or
destroyed by proponent include those lost or destroyed at his direction).
12 See Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 312-17 (letter from Sen. John
McClellan to Rep. William Hungate, Feb. 16, 1973). Changes in the rule regarding
impeachment by prior conviction particularly reflect such pressure. See id. at 316-17.
Compare PaoPosE FED. R. EvD. 609 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) witb PROPOSEm
CHANGES rule 609, supra note 10, at 21-22.
13 For example, rule 103 (d) defines plain error using the same term, "substantial rights,"
as is used in the definition of harmless error in the federal procedural rules. This invites
the confusion that error is both prejudicial and plain if it affects substantial rights, and
harmless if it does not, and thus that there is no prejudicial error that is not also plain
error. Compare PROPOSED Fm. R. Evw. 103 (d) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) witb
FED. R. Civ. P. 61 and FED. R. CraM. P. 52 (a) - (b).
Rule 613, prescribing the foundation for former statements of witnesses, is ambiguous
as to whether the opportunity to explain, deny, or challenge the statement must be ac-
corded prior to the introduction of the statement. See PaoPosE FED. R. EvID. 613 (Su-
preme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Furthermore, clarification is needed in the related area
of the foundation required for bias impeachment. Schmertz & Czapansiy, Bias Impeach-
ment and the Proposed Federal Rules of Eidence, 61 GEo. L.J. 257, 265-70 (1972).
An additional change in the Rules is needed in Article VII which relates to expert
testimony. Article VII dispenses with the requirement of showing the basis of an ex-
pert's testimony in direct examination and dispenses with the necessity for the hypo-
thetical question. The cross-examiner may bring out the basis on cross-examination but
rarely will attempt to do so without the advance preparation which formerly was af-
forded, in part, by the direct examination. Because the onus of investigation is thus on the
opponent of the expert and because in criminal procedure discovery is minimal, pro-
vision should be made for discovery and notice respecting the expert. Civil discovery
also may be inadequate to prepare a challenge. See PaoPosE FED. R. EvID. 701-06 (Supreme
1973]
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PRIVILEGE
The Rules as approved by the Supreme Court prescribe an exclusive
list of carefully defined privileges for all federal court proceedings, civil
and criminal, diversity and federal question.14 The Subcommittee's pro-
posed amendments, however, would eliminate this list of privileges and,
depending on the claim or defense involved, instead would apply either
state law or a federal law of privileges to be developed on a case-by-
case basis.15 Because the Supreme Court Draft provides more affirmative
guidance on difficult policy questions and unifies federal evidence law,
its approach is more useful than that of the proposed amendments.10
Court Draft Nov. 1972); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (A) (i); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (4) (A)
(i). See also P. RoTHsTEtN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 82-88
(Law Journal Press 1973) [hereinafter cited as UNDERSrANDING THE RULES] (need for
clarification of relation of best evidence and hearsay rules to expert testimony).
Several ambiguities exist in the Rules at present. See, e.g., PROPosED FED. R. EvD. 407,
408, 411 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (varying terms for similar thoughts); id.
801(d) (2) (applicability of predecessor-in-interest rule); id. 801(d), 803, 804 (applicabil-
ity of opinion rule to out-of-court statements); id. 602, 801(d), 803, 804 (relation of
personal knowledge rule to out-of-court declarants); id. 801(d), 803, 804, 901-03, 1001-08
(applicability to out-of-court statements of authentication and best evidence require-
ments); id. 803(6)-(7), 901-03, 1001-08 (relation among authentication and best evidence
rules, the business records exception to hearsay rule, and the Federal Business Records
Acts); id. 403, 801(d), 803, 804 (relation of probative-prejudice balancing rule to out-of-
court statements). See UNDERsTANDING THE RULEs, supra at 28-29, 77, 108, 114-16, 121-22.
14 PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. art. V (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); see Krattenmaker,
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules
o Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61 (1973) (discussion of Supreme Court Draft privilege rules).
1 5 PROPOSED CHANGEs art. V, supra note 10, at 12-18.
S1 Because as complete a definition as practicable of the scope of federal privileges
ought to be provided, the general provision in the Supreme Court Draft defining the
word "privilege" in the evidentiary context should be retained. See PRoPoSED FED. R.
Evm. 501 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The provisions dealing with disclosures
under compulsion and with jury instructions and comments upon invocation also should
remain. See id. 512, 513.
Further, rule 511 concerning waiver of privileges also should be retained, but one flaw
must be corrected. See id. 511. The rule presently provides that a privilege is waived if
a voluntary non-privileged disclosure of otherwise privileged information is made. Thus,
if the privilege holder tells the secret not only to his psychotherapist or clergyman, but
also to his mother, father, or spouse, the privilege can be waived. Communications to the
mother, father, or spouse ought to be regarded as facilitative of. the communication to
the psychotherapist or clergyman and should not constitute waiver. Either rule 511 or
the privilege rules themselves should be altered to protect such facilitative communica-
tions. See generally Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 70-71.
Another criticism of rule 511 is unfounded. A state secret leaked to the press would
not still remain privileged. Although voluntary disclosure is provided as one kind of
waiver, the converse, that the privilege remains if disclosure is involuntary, does not
follow. Further, rule 509, the state secrets privilege, states that only a "secret" is priv-
ileged.
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Consequently, although certain changes should be made in the Supreme
Court Draft before final adoption, its general format should be retained.
Evidentiary privileges clearly affect conduct outside the courtroom
and touch matters of state policy. Nonetheless, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer,17 the Advisory Committee did not
feel compelled to provide for deference to state law, even in diversity
cases.18 The Advisory Committee, while recognizing that some forum
shopping and infringement of state policies might result from a diver-
gence between federal and state privilege law, concluded that adverse
effects in these areas would be minimal and more than compensated by
the value of having uniform rules in federal courts.' 9
The Supreme Court Draft recognizes only nine specifically defined
privileges. 20 Conspicuous by their absence are several well-known priv-
ileges. The Supreme Court Draft does not contain a general physician-
patient privilege, but only a psychotherapist-patient privilege. There is
no spousal communications privilege in any kind of case, and the priv-
ilege against adverse spousal testimony is confined to criminal cases. In
addition, the Supreme Court Draft lacks any provision for a journalist's
privilege. Some critics contend that these priVileges are desirable or at
least ought to be recognized in federal courts where recognized by state
law.2' Others, raising a broader question, urge that greater deference be
accorded state privilege law across-the-board. 22
The Subcommittee's proposed amendments, which were intended to
eliminate the problems detected in the Supreme Court Draft, actually
sidestep many of them. Rather than a list of specific privileges prescribed
for all federal court proceedings, the amendments would provide that
17 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
38 See PRoposED FED. R. Evw. 501, Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov.
1972).
19 Id. But see Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 101-17.
20 Article V consists of a privilege for those reports required under state or federal
statute, when that statute grants a privilege (rule 502); a lawyer-client communications
privilege (rule 503); a psychotherapist-patient communications privilege (rule 504); a
privilege of. an accused to prevent his spouse from testifying against him in a criminal
proceeding (rule 505); a privilege covering communications to clergymen (rule 506);
a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of one's lawful vote (rule 507); a trade secrets
privilege (rule 508); a privilege covering secrets of state and other official information
(rule 509); and a privilege covering the identity of an informer (rule 510). PRoposEri
Fa. R. EviD. art. V (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Article V also provides for addi-
tional privileges if required by the Constitution, an act of Congress, or other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court. Id. 501.
21 See Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 101-17.
22 See Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal
Rules of Evidence, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 353, 361-73 (1969); Wright, Procedural Reform:
Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 571-74 (1967).
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state privilege law govern in civil cases "with respect to a claim or de-
fense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision" 23 and that com-
mon law principles "interpreted in the light of reason and experience"
govern privileges in all other federal actions.24 In addition to requiring,
unwisely, that both state and federal evidence law be applied in a single
case,25 the amendments could introduce an unfortunate distinction be-
tween ultimate and mediate facts. 6
The Supreme Court Draft's list of carefully defined privileges clearly
is the better approach. Whatever its flaws, the Supreme Court Draft at
least attempts to grapple with the issues and provide clear-cut answers
regarding difficult policy questions. Sufficient experience has been ac-
cumulated concerning evidence questions to permit definite choices in
most areas, including privilege. Having a clear and easily located body
of law for uniform use in all federal courts is necessary if evidentiary
questions in the hurly-burly of daily litigation are to be handled soundly,
expeditiously, and without protracted appeals. 27 Infringement of state
policies, difficulties encountered by lawyers practicing in both state
and federal courts, and forum shopping, can be minimized if the federal
privilege rules are drawn in general accord with the policies behind pre-
23 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 501, supra note 10, at 12. Some federal courts have felt com-
pelled, for reasons often related to Erie considerations, to apply the state law of priv-
ileges. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
965 (1956); Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Berdon v.
McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29, 31-32 (ED. Mich. 1953). See also Louisell, Confidentiality, Con-
formity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. RFv. 101 (1956).
This practice often seems at variance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
provide that state law should be rejected on evidence questions if it is more restrictive
respecting admissibility than federal statute or former federal equity practice. See Fro.
R. CQv. P. 43 (a).
24 POpOSED CHANGES rule 501, supra note 10, at 12. The "common law ... reason
experience" standard is, under present rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
applicable to all evidentiary questions in federal criminal cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26. The
proposed amendments would limit this standard to questions of privilege but extend
it beyond criminal cases to federal claims or defenses in civil cases.25 Similar difficulties are presented by identical language in the proposed amendment
to rule 601 regarding incompetencies. See notes 70-74 infra and accompanying text.26 See note 72 infra. Ambiguity inherent in the language "supplies the rule of decision"
also may create difficulties. See note 73 infra.
27The present sources of evidence law are cumbersome, unlikely to produce uni-
formity, often fail to provide an answer, and place a premium on a lawyer's experience
in practice in the particular locale of the trial. Moreover, federal appeals judges should
not be required to achieve expertise in the law of each state comprising their circuit.
Disuniformity among federal courts also hinders the practice of assigning federal judges
to sit away from their home jurisdiction. See generally Deguan, The Law of Federal
Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. Rmv. 275 (1962); Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules
of Evidence, 52 ConrNELL L.Q. 177 (1967); Orfield, Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence,
67 DICK. L. REv. 381 (1963); Weinstein, supra note 22.
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vailing state privileges where such policies seem at all justifiable. More-
over, divergence between state and federal law will diminish as states
imitate the federal rules. 28
The Supreme Court Draft should be revised in several respects to con-
form more closely to privilege policies prevailing in the states. The
spousal communications privilege,29 found in nearly every state, should
be reinstated. While this privilege actually may not encourage commun-
ication between husband and wife, it probably is reflective of another
justifiable policy concern-popular revulsion at the disclosure of such
confidences.30 The adverse spousal testimony privilege,-3  which does ap-
pear in the Supreme Court Draft,32 should be retained in modified form.
28 It is reasonable to expect that federal evidence rules will be widely copied by the
states, as were the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 1B J. Mooa & T. CURaRIR,
MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.504, at 5041 & n.10 (2d ed. 1965); cf. Krattenmaker,
supra note 14, at 64-65 (Supreme Court Draft privilege rules so inconsistent and without
underlying rationale that they will not provide model that states will copy). Three
states already have adopted evidence rules patterned after drafts of. the proposed federal
rules. See NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 4, ch. 47-52 (1971); NEw MEXICO RULES OF EVIDENCE, 84
N.M. xi, xi-cxxxi (1973); WISCONSIN RuLES OF EVIDENCE, WST 1973 Wis. LEoisLATIW
S V. 131.
29 This privilege covers communications of a confidential nature between husband and
wife. It covers communications whether introduced for or against a spouse and can be
applied to any form of evidence of the spousal communication, whether or not either
spouse is a party to the litigation or is asked to testify. The privilege, applicable in both
civil and criminal cases, usually is limited to communications made during the marriage
but continues even after the marriage has ended. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S.
1, 6 (1954) (dictum). See generally Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 143-45 (6th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 849 (1945); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006,
1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1943); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE ch. 83 (3d ed.
1940); Comment, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, in
Symposizmz-Evidentiary Privileges, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 208 (1961).3 0 See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 227 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOIK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 86, at 173 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CORMIcK].
31 This privilege covers testimony given by one spouse against the other, regardless
of whether the subject matter of the testimony is a communication. This privilege gen-
erally is applied only in criminal cases and only when the spouse is a party in the liti-
gation and the testimony is adverse to the spouse. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362
U.S. 525, 526-31 (1960); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75-79 (1958); United
States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949). See gen-
erally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ch. 79 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, supra note 29.
Spousal privilege is today generally a matter of statute. Virtually every state has a
spousal communications privilege, and approximately two-thirds of the states have an
adverse spousal testimony privilege of some form, the large majority confining it to
criminal cases. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (1959) (spousal communica-
tions and adverse spousal testimony); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683 (1964) (adverse
spousal testimony); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.18 (1958) (spousal communications); cf. Wis-
CONSiN RuLEs oF EVIDENCE, WEST 1973 Wis. LEGISLATIVE SERv. 131. See generally 2 J.
WIGMORF, EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1972).
32 PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 505 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
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If properly drawn, it will serve a valid function in preserving marital
harmony and in according respect to the popular aversion to testimony
by one spouse against the other. The Supreme Court Draft, however,
in assigning the privilege to the defendant spouse rather than the testify-
ing spouse, permits a defendant to prevent his spouse, who may wish to
testify, from so doing. Normally a spouse's willingness to testify be-
speaks an absence of the marital harmony the privilege seeks to protect.
Moreover, the community's sense of justice is unlikely to be offended
if such testimony is admitted, provided the testimony does not concern
a marital confidence protected by the marital communications privilege.
Consequently, there is little reason to suppress this testimony and deprive
the court of relevant evidence.88
The Supreme Court Draft also should be amended to include a gen-
eral physician-patient privilege.34 This privilege, some form of which
exists in 43 states and the District of Columbia,85 probably does aid the
flow of complete and accurate information from patient to doctor. Al-
though the Advisory Committee was unreceptive to a privilege so ex-
tensively riddled with exceptions,8" protection of the physician-patient
relationship is sufficiently widespread to warrant inclusion in the Rules.
33 Rule 505 provides several exceptions to the adverse spousal testimony privilege. Id.
505(c). These exceptions are not drawn in accord with any rational policy objective
of the privilege. See generally Rothstein, A Re-Evaluation of the Privilege Against
Adverse Spousal Testimony in the Light of its Purpose, 12 INT'L & Compy. L.Q. 1189
(1963).
34Rule 504 of the Supreme Court Draft provides only a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, but defines psychotherapist broadly so as to include not only psychiatrists and
psychologists, but also ordinary physicians while treating mental or emotional conditions.
See Paoposxm FED. R. Evm. 504 (a) (2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The drafters do
not consider the possibility that there is a mental or emotional aspect or sequela to all
illnesses.
35 See 1 ROTHSTEiN, HELFMAN, JASmTT, LuTzKER, SCHNEIDER & STEIN, Accrss To MEDICAL
Rxcomws 8 (Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare 1972) (study for the Secretary's Com-
mission on Medical Malpractice) (law of each state treated in detail in volumes 2-5).
See also DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuCAnoNr & WELFARE, REPoRT oF THE SEcRETARY'S CoMMIssION
oN MEDICAL MAIPRACnCE, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE app. 177, 179 (Dep't H.E.W. Pub. No.
(OS)73-88 & (OS)73-89) (summary of Access to Medical Records Report); 8 J. WIG-
MoRE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1972).
36PRoPosED FED. R. Evm. 504, Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov.
1972). An additional reason advanced for retention of only a psychotherapist-patient
privilege was the greater need for protection of the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
A man would be foolish not to communicate fxeely with the person who is going to
prescribe medication or operate, but a privilege may be necessary to encourage the free
communication required for successful psychiatric treatment. Id. A privilege also may be
required to get a person to seek psychiatric treatment in the first place. See also Loulsell
& Sinclair, Reflection on the Law of Privileged Cornmmications-The Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege in Perspective, 59 CALIF. L. Rxv. 30, 51-53 (1971).
[Vol. 62:125
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Forum shopping, conflict with state policy, and other difficulties en-
gendered by divergence between state and federal law, can be minimized
if an effort is made to identify and codify the most frequent exceptions
to the privilege.
Although not related to conformity with state policy, several changes
should be made in the attorney-client privilege of the Supreme Court
Draft. First, rule 503 (b) should be revised to provide clearly that in situ-
ations involving more than one attorney and client, a client may prevent
disclosure of responses made by an attorney representing another inter-
ested party that inferentially reveal the client's communication."7 Second,
uncommunicated opinions in a lawyer's file also should be protected. 8
Third, rule 503 (c) should be amended to make clear that an attorney
may claim the privilege on behalf of his client, even if the communica-
tion was made to a different attorney previously representing the client.3 9
Fourth, the exception for consultations in furtherance of crime or fraud
should be expanded to include clear torts.40 Fifth, rule 503 should pro-
vide guidance regarding stockholder access to communications between
the corporation and its lawyers.41 Finally, the definition of lawyer in
37 The rule presently provides that in such situations, only communications "by" the,
client are privileged, instead of communications "between" the lawyer and the client.
as is stated for the single attorney situation. PioPoSED FED. R. Evm. 503 (b) (Supreme
Court Draft Nov. 1972). Through use of the word "by," the rule apparently seekq to
avoid the situation in which, after a joint conference, a client is prevented by the
privilege claims of, the other clients from disclosing his own statements or those of his
attorney. See id. Advisory Comm. Note. As the rule stands, a client's only hope, respect-
ing the problem in text, is to argue that a response by another attorney is "evidence" of
a communication "by" the client, much as testimony about it or a document containing
it would be, and that the response therefore should be suppressed under the privilege.
38 Such documents might be protected independently of the evidence rules by the
work product privilege. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b) (3). However, the attorney-client privilege often will be the only recourse. To
apply the rule as presently drafted to this situation requires the sometimes difficult argu-
ment that the uncommunicated material contains or evidences a prior communication
of the client. Unless explicit coverage is enacted, the attorey-client privilege may not
fully encourage disclosure to an attorney, and on occasion the quality of legal services
could be affected.
39 The rule presently provides that the "person who was the lawyer at the time of
the communication may claim the privilege." PROPOSED FED. R. EvM. 503 (c) (Supreme
Court Draft Nov. 1972). The inference thus arises that the attorney at trial cannot claim
the privilege for his client if he was not the attorney when the communication was made.
4o See id. 503 (d) (1). Whether or not this exception is expanded, a procedure should
be enacted for determining whether a consultation was unlawful.
41 An express exception to the privilege might be provided when a stockholder is in-
volved in litigation on behalf of the corporation or represents a class owning a majority
of the shares of the corporation. See 45 Tur.L. L. REV. 1063 (1971). Contra, Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69 COLUM. L. Rxv. 309, 316-19 (1969).
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rule 503 (a) (2) should be expanded to include the new professional cor-
poration law firm. Drafting problems similar to the preceding ones in
the attorney-client rule, are present in some of the other privilege pro-
visions.42
A journalists' privilege should not appear in the federal evidence rules
even though some form of this privilege is desirable. 8 Instead, separate
federal legislation should be enacted, mandating the privilege for both
Specific guidance also could be provided on the difficult issue of distinguishing legal
communications from business communications when the corporation's attorney is also
on the board of directors or otherwise involved in management or ownership.
Further, the Supreme Court Draft permits an extremely liberal test as to what are
lawyer-client communications in the corporate context; by one interpretation com-
munications of a legal nature by any employee to the corporation's lawyer would be
privileged. Because the work-product principle provides sufficient protection for such
employee communications, a more restrictive lawyer-client privilege is preferable. See
FEn. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3). See also Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate
Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 H~Av. L. REv. 424 (1970).
42 The problem of uncommunicated opinions also arises in rule 504, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, with respect to notations made and filed by a psychiatrist, not corm-
municated to the patient, and not directly regarding a communication from the patient.
Such opinions would not be privileged unless they embody or evidence a patient com-
munication. PRoosED FED. R. EviD. 504 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); cf. note 38
supra and accompanying text. A general physician-patient privilege, if adopted, would
have to be broad enough to cover the various kinds of hospital records that are, arguably
at least, neither communications nor uncommunicated opinions. In some cases these ex-
tensions of the privilege would foster the seeking of professional help, full disclosure,
and more informed medical services.
The trade secrets privilege, rule 508, also reflects poor drafting. By one interpretation
that privilege is not available to corporations, who most need the protection. Corporations
are not included explicitly among those who may hold the privilege, as they are in
rule 502, defining the holder of the required reports privilege, and in rule 503 (a) (1),
defining the holder of the attorney-client privilege. Cmnpare PROPOSED FED. R. EID. 508
(Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) 'with id. 502 and id. 503(a) (1). The trade secrets
privilege also should specify that licensees of a trade secret can invoke the privilege.
The communications to clergymen privilege, rule 506, presently covers only communi-
cations by the penitent, not communications between clergyman and penitent. PROPOSED
FED. R. EviD. 506 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Thus, the drafting raises the prob-
lem of revealing inferentially the penitents communication through compelled dis-
closure of the clergyman's response. Cf. note 37 supra and accompanying text.
43This judgment involves consideration of the extent to which (1) the media are
necessary to watchdog other institutions, (2) the media have been effectively performing
without privilege, (3) privilege encourages sources to give information or misinforma-
tion, and (4) government informants and media informants are comparable. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW, UNIFORM REPORTERS' PRIVILEGE
Acr (First Tentative Draft, 1973). The Supreme Court has held that a general journalists'
privilege is not required constitutionally. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Nevertheless, as of 1970, 19 jurisdictions had some form of journalists' privilege. See
Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 368 (testimony of The Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional
Right to Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 321 n.15 (1970).
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federal and state proceedings.4 If a journalists' privilege is to encourage
prospective informants in this day of multi-jurisdictional events and
media, it must assure confidentiality in all jurisdictions.
The privileges accorded the Government 45 and corporations46 in the
Supreme Court Draft are significantly broader than the narrowly de-
fined personal privileges.41 The overly sweeping protection granted the
Government in the Supreme Court Draft for "secrets of state" and "offi-
cial information" resulted from late changes by the Advisory Com-
mittee.48 If the rule granting this protection is retained,49 the category
of official information should be removed"0 since the secrets of state
privilege sufficiently protects the Government. The Supreme Court Draft
also should be altered to require the Government, in asserting the state
secrets privilege, to show more than a reasonable likelihood that evidence
would reveal "a governmental secret relating to... national defense or
44 Twenty-four news media privilege bills of one sort or another have been introduced
during the current session of Congress, and 28 during the previous session. See Hearings
on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 385 (testimony of The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press).
4 5 PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 509-10 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
46 ld. 502-03, 508.
4T This contrast has raised allegations of bias in favor of the wealthy and powerful. See
Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 73-74, 77; Letter from Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. to Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States,
July 28, 1971, in Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 196.
48 Compare PROPOSED FED. R. Evi. 509 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) 'with id.
(Rev. Draft Mar. 1971).
41 Since only one case, United States v'. Reynolds, has considered carefully this priv-
ilege, codification perhaps should be delayed until more judicial experience concerning
the privilege is amassed. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Moreover, the
state secrets privilege does not come up so frequently in litigation that a codified rule is
needed.
50See PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 509 (a) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Official in-
formation is defined as virtually any information that is not within the state secrets
privilege and is not available pursuant to the Jencks Act or the largely ineffectual Free-
dom of Information Act. Id.; see Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970); Freedom of In-
formation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). The concerns behind this privilege apparently
are feared loss, destruction, damage, or alteration of government files, avoiding undue
inconvenience, separation of powers, avoiding release of viewpoints in the formative
stages, and assurance of confidentiality where necessary to encourage free communication
both within and from without the Government. While these interests may justify with-
holding certain information from the general public under the Freedom of Information
Act, the same considerations should not govern an evidentiary privilege, where the liti-
gants and the court have special need for the information. See PRoPosED FED. R. EvID.
509, Advisory Comm. Note (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). Admittedly, the showing necessary
to justify secrecy is greater under the rule than under the Freedom of Information Act,
for the rule additionally requires a showing that disclosure would be against the public
interest. Comzpare PROPOSE FED. R. Evm. 509(a) (2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972)
• vith 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1970).
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international relations." "- A better standard would require a showing
of reasonable likelihood that disclosure would be detrimental or injurious
to national defense or international relations.52 Procedurally, the Govern-
ment should not be able to require that its arguments and showings on
the issue of privilege be made in camera;53 rather, a judge should order
in camera proceedings only if justice so requires."
The identity-of-informer privilege should be amended to exclude in-
formers to legislative committees and their staffsY Moreover, the identity
of informers to law enforcement agencies should be protected only if
the informer furnishes information purporting to reveal a violation of
law, not just, as under the Supreme Court Draft, "information relating
to or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of law." " Addi-
tionally, the circumstances should be expanded in which a judge is re-
quired to enter an order favorable to a private party who is foreclosed
from obtaining information by the government's privilegeY7
5i PRoPosED FED. R. Evm. 509(a) (1) & (b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). More-
over, "due regard" apparently is to be accorded the executive's classification of, the in-
formation. See id. 509, Advisory Comm. Note.52 See id. 509(a) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971).
53 As used in the Rules, an in camera proceeding is an ex parte proceeding held in
secret. See id. 509(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
154This limitation should apply as well to rule 510, the identity-of-informers privilege.
Compare PRoPosED FED. R. EvI,. 509(c), 510(c) (2) & (3) (Supreme Court Draft Nov.
1972) 'with id. 509(b), 510(c) (3) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). Because government officials.
may exaggerate the need for secrecy and be more solicitous of their own immediate
concerns than of the broad spectrum of societal concerns, it is difficult to see how a
court, without some form of party confrontation, can determine fairly whether the
privilege should be -applied. The Supreme Court Draft should be altered to provide
explicitly that an in camera proceeding shall be held only when the judge determines
that such a procedure is necessary to protect the state secret or the informer's identity
and that unfairness will not result to the private party. Moreover, the judge should:
have the power, if warranted by the circumstances, to reveal to a private party matters
disclosed in camera, regardless of the contrary wishes of the Government. But see id.
509(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (such power explicitly denied).
Whereas earlier drafts were silent, the Supreme Court Draft rule respecting state-
secrets provides that the judge may not penetrate the secret to resolve the privilege issue.
Id. 509(c). In United States v. Reynolds the Court held out the possibility that such
penetration might be permissible under appropriate circumstances. 345 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1953).
55 Compare PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 510(a) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) ,with id.
(Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). This additional guarantee of confidentiality to potential com-
mittee informants probably will not result in significantly more information reaching
legislative bodies. Grants of immunity probably are the significant tool in this area.
GO Compare PRoPosa FD. R. Evm. 510 (a) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) 'with id.
(Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). The expanded provision of the Supreme Court Draft is unlikely
to pay dividends sufficient to justify such a broad bar to'ascertainment of truth,
5"See id. 510(c) (2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). This rule provides that an
order in favor of a private party (for example, establishing a litigated fact or dismissing,
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WITNESS COMPETENCY
The Supreme Court Draft eliminates all witness incompetenies's0
other than those of judges, 9 jurors,0° and persons lacking personal
knowledge."1 Gone are the incompetencies of children, 2 dead men, 63
mental defecdves,6 drug- and alcohol-impaired persons,65 spouses,"' and
atheists, 7 which join other incompetencies rejected at an earlier stage of
our legal history."" Moreover, as in the case of privileges, the competency
a case) may be entered on a showing of reasonable probability that the informer can
give testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence in a criminal
case, or of a material issue in a civil case. Id. The material issue test should be applied
in both civil and criminal cases, since it is a fairer standard and comes closer to the one
provided in the leading case on the subject. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,
60-61 (1957) (disclosure of informer's identity permitted where "relevant and helpful
to defense .. . or essential to fair determination"). An earlier draft applied the mateilal
issue test to both civil and criminal cases. See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 510(c) (2) (Rev.
Draft Mar. 1971). In addition, it should be sufficient that "circumstances indicate" the
reasonable probability, without an affirmative showing.
5 8PaoPosE FED. R. EvID. 601 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
ED ld. 605.
60 Id. 606.
61 Id. 602.
62 See, e.g., Litzkuhn v. Clark, 85 Ariz. 355, 339 P.2d 389 (1959); State v. Segerberg, 131
Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101 (1945); Artesani v. Gritton, 252 N.C. 463, 113 S.E.2d 895 (1960).
See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 505-09 (3d ed. 1940).
63 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 3 (1971); N.Y. Cim. PRAc. LAW § 4519 (McKinney
1963); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 3716 (1925). See generally Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24
OHIo ST. L.J. 89 (1963).04 See, e.g., People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 309, 317 P.2d 974 (1957); Aguilar v. State,
279 App. Div. 103, 108 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1951), appeal withdrawn, 304 N.Y. 616, 107 NXE.2d
94 (1952) (mem.); State v. Comstock, 137 W. Va. 152, 70 S.E.2d 648 (1952). See generally
2 J. WiGmORE, EvIDENCE §§ 492-98, 501 (3d ed. 1940).
65 See, e.g., State v. Ballesteros, 100 Ariz. 262, 413 P.2d 739 (1966); Hartford v. Palmer,
16 Johns. 143 (N.Y. 1819) (per curiam); Burnette v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 578, 1
S.E.2d 268 (1939). See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 492-97, 499, 501 (3d ed. 1940).
66 While the total incompetency of a witness to testify in any case involving his spouse
no longer exists, lesser spousal incompetencies have persisted in some jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948); Zakrzewsld v. Zakrzewski, 237
Mich. 459, 212 N.W. 80 (1927); In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930); Esparza
v. Esparza, 382 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See generally 2 J. WiGmoRF, EVIDENCE
§§ 600-20 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other
in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communica-
tions: Modem Trend, 38 VA. L. REy. 359 (1952).
07 The common law incompetency of. nonbelievers has been abrogated widely. Mc-
Clellan v. Owens, 335 Mo. 884, 74 S.W.2d 570 (1934); State v. Hicks, 257 S.C. 279, 185
S.E.2d 746 (1971). Further, the constitutionality of such a rule is questionable. See Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (similar prerequisite for public office unconstitutional).
Nevertheless, there is contrary precedent in some jurisdictions. See Pumphrey v. State,
84 Neb. 636, 122 N.W. 19 (1909); State v. Levine, 109-N.J.L. 503, 162"A. 909 (1932).
08 For example, incompetencies based on conviction of crime and on an interest in the
outcome have been abrogated widely. See McCoRMIcKi, supra note 30, §§ 61, 64-654
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rules of the Supreme Court Draft make no provision for deference to
state law, even in diversity cases.69
As one of two important changes, the Subcommittee's proposed
amendments would provide that state competency law govern in civil
cases "with respect to a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision .... " 70 This language unwisely requires application
of a dual body of evidence law in cases involving both state and federal
claims or defenses. 71 The application of a dual body of evidence law
would have its worst effects in, for example, a case involving joined fed-
eral antitrust and state unfair competition claims, where a witness might
be competent to testify concerning only the antitrust claim even though
the same testimony bears on both claims. These problems are com-
pounded by ambiguities inherent in the words "with respect to" 72 and
Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IowA L. REv. 482, 496 (1939). Of course
these considerations of capacity may play a role in the jury's assessment of credibility.
But see Paoposm FED. R. Evm. 610 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (evidence of re-
ligious beliefs or opinions not admissible to impair or enhance credibility). In an extreme
case, these considerations also might prompt a court to exercise its general authority
to exclude substantially worthless, misleading, or prejudicial evidence. See id. 403.
IN PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 601 & Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov.
1972).
10 PRoPosED CHAoEs rule 601, supra note 10, at 19. Except for competency of jurors,
the amendment allows the provisions of the Supreme Court draft to control in other
situations. See notes 75-76 infra and accompanying text.
11 Irrespective of the basis of jurisdiction, mixed state and federal claims and defenses
can be present in the same case, even though there is but a single cause of action. See,
e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333
US. 445 (1948); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). The required
application of a dual body of evidence law could have the undesirable effect of tipping
the balance against the discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction, which depends
largely upon considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants.
See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
12the language of the witness competency amendment risks introducing difficulties
posed by similar language in rule 302 of. the Supreme Court Draft, which provides that
state law is to determine the effect of a presumption "respecting a fact which is an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision ... ,"
PRoposED FED. R. Evm. 302 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Lesser, or "tactical," pre-
sumptions are always governed by federal law. Id. 302, Advisory Comm. Note. Thus, the
rule quite unwisely necessitates an inquiry into whether the presumption relates to an
element (ultimate fact) or to a lesser (mediate) fact. This unfortunate distinction which
frequently is difficult to draw, can be illustrated by a plaintiff's attempt to apply a pre-
sumption under state law concerning regular business procedures. Specifically, he may
wish to prove that his letter accepting the defendant's offer was mailed by showing
that he placed it in his office out-basket for mailing. The act of mailing the letter would
be an ultimate fact only if it establishes acceptance, an element of the plaintiff's claim. If
his acceptance is not complete on mailing, but rather on receipt by the offeror, the act
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in the words "supplies the rule of decision." 73
Although the best solution would be to apply federal evidence law
in all federal cases, an intermediate yet satisfactory solution exists. State
evidence law might be applied across-the-board in cases wherein the only
ground for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, while federal
evidence law might be applied in pure federal question cases.71 In those
instances where both diversity and federal question jurisdiction exists,
the evidence law applicable to the entire case might be determined on
the basis of whether state or federal issues predominate.
In another important change, the Subcommittee's proposed amend-
ments would broaden significantly the competency of a juror in an in-
quiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment in which he participated.
Returning to the language of earlier drafts,75 the Subcommittee would
permit a juror to testify or give affidavit with regard to all matters ex-
-cept his or another juror's mental or emotional processes .7 Under the
Supreme Court Draft, which itself may be too broad, a juror can testify
-or give an affidavit concerning extraneous prejudicial information im-
properly brought to the attention of the jury or an outside influence
of mailing the letter probably is only a mediate fact. Even in cases involving only state
claims and defenses, a dual body of evidence law would be applicable, for presumptions
of mediate facts always are controlled by federal law under the Supreme Court Draft. Id.
The proposed amendments to the privilege and competency rules do not incorporate
.expressly the ultimate-mediate distinction. The language refers only to a "claim or
defense" and not to an element thereof. PaoPosED CttANGES rules 501, 601, supra note 10,
-at 12, 19. Nonetheless, there is danger that the courts might borrow the distinction from
the presumption rule in determining whether a privilege or competency is "with respect
to" a state claim or defense. The mere elimination of the reference to elements is in-
sufficient to preclude the application of the ultimate-mediate distinction to such questions.
78 The decision as to whether state or federal law provides the rule of decision may
be particularly difficult where federal law, concededly controlling, incorporates state
law. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956)
(amount of damages recoverable); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (legitimacy
of child); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) (statute of limitations). See als&
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
74 The approach advocated here should be applied to presumptions, as well as io
privileges and competency. The Advisory Committee concludes that under the Erie
doctrine, state law must govern certain presumptions. PaoPosE Fmn. R. Evn,. 302, Ad-
visory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). But see Hanna v. Plumer, 38a
U.S. 460 (1965). Indisputably, a presumption has a greater effect on the complexion of
a right or obligation than does a privilege or competency. Thus, there is more justifica-
tion, and perhaps more need, for some deference to state presumption law. That need,
when balanced with the federal interest in a single body of evidence law for each case,
is met sufficiently if the application of state law is limited to diversity cases. See Hdnna
v. Plumer, supra.
7 5See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 606(b) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971); id. 6-06(b) (Prelim.
Draft Mar. 1969).76 PaOPOSED Cffmr.Es rule 606(b), supra note 10, at 20.
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improperly brought to bear on a juror.77 The Subcommittee's approach
is antithetical to the smooth functioning of the jury system and con-
fficts with the traditional policy justifications for juror incompetency-
the encouragement of full and frank jury deliberations and the avoidance
of juror harrassment, annoyance, and reprisals.78 Furthermore, although
a number of jurisdictions do apply a more liberal standard than that of
the Supreme Court Draft, only California's standard seems so expansive
as to permit testimony on all matters other than mental and emotional
processes. 79
PRsuMvpTIoNS AcuNsrT THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES
The Supreme Court Draft, in prescribing the effect of statutory and
common law presumptions in civil and criminal proceedings, distinguishes
between one general and two special classes of presumptions." The gen-
eral class, which consists of presumptions affecting federal claims and
defenses in civil cases, presumptions affecting mediate factual proposi-
tions involved in state claims and defenses, and presumptions favoring
the accused in criminal cases, places the burden of persuasion on the
party against whom the presumption operates.8 ' Presumptions directly
affecting elements of state claims and defenses in civil cases fall within
one special class and are governed by state law. " The other special class
consists of presumptions against the accused in federal criminal cases. 8
These are circumscribed by a prohibition against directing a finding of
fact against the accused, and, in addition, their submission to the jury
is not mandatory.84 Further, the Supreme Court Draft accords little ef-
fect to these presumptions, 8 and no effect when the court con-
77 PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 606 (b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). It may be unwise
to render jurors competent to testify concerning extraneous prejudicial information
improperly brought to the jury's attention. Such a rule might render verdicts subject to
challenge on grounds that a news report came to the jury's attention. This may permit
juror harrassment or threats by dissatisfied litigants seeking to obtain statements im-
peaching the verdict. In contrast, juror competency concerning threats and similar out-
side influences under the Supreme Court Draft does serve the important function of
discouraging such threats or harrassments.
78 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,267-68 (1915).
79 Compare People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal.2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1969)
'with Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1966) and Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan.
415 (1874) and State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955) and Grenz v. Werre,
129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964).
80 See generally UNtRsrAmiNG rn RuLEs, supra note 13, at 13-18.
81PRoPosm FED. R. Evm. 301 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
82 Id. 302.
W3 See id. 303.
8 4 See id. 303 (b).
85 The only effect of a presumption under the Supreme Court Draft is to invoke the
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cludes that, on the evidence presented, the trier of fact reasonably can-
not perceive a rational connection between the fact or facts giving rise
to the presumption and the presumed fact. This test exceeds the re-
strictions heretofore endorsed by the Supreme Court.8 6 Although Con-
gress may be displeased by the limited effect given to statutory presump-
tions, the restrictions prescribed by the Supreme Court Draft are in
harmony with Anglo-American notions of fairness in criminal cases.
The Subcommittee's proposed amendments would remove from the
Rules all criminal presumptions and leave that subject to separate legisla-
tion now pending before the Senate.s7 Even if this separate legislation
were not deficient in certain respects,"8 codifying the entire law of pre-
sumptions in the federal evidence rules would be preferable. 9 Certain
changes proposed by this legislation might be incorporated in the pro-
posed amendments if necessary to gain congressional adoption of the
Rules.90
rather mild instruction required by rule 303 (c), which in most instances would be given
anyway. Rule 303 (c) provides that when the existence of a presumed fact is to be
decided by the jury, the judge must instruct them that the presumed fact may, but need
not, be found. If the presumed fact is an ultimate one, the judge also must instruct that
it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 303 (c).
86 The Supreme Court has held that a statutory presumption is acceptable if a reason-
able factual basis for the presumption existed before the legislature, not necessarily in
the evidence before the jury. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); of. United States
v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). See generally
CLARK BOARDMAN FEDERAL PRACTICE SERIEs, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EvwintcE (P. Rothstein
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as RoTHsTEIN oN RuLEs].
8 7 See S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The *proto-
type of S. 1 is the final report of the Brown Commission. NAIONAL COMMIssIN ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL. CRIMiNAL CODE (1971),
reprinted in Hearings on the Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 1, at 129 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NAONAL
CoMmissIN ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRImiNAL LAWS].
88 S. 1 fails to insure that findings of fact will not be directed against the accused
since it contains no specific prohibition and since it applies only to statutory presumptions
(and probably only those pertaining to ultimate facts), thus leaving common law and
mediate fact presumptions unregulated. S. 1 also is defective because it applies a reason-
able doubt standard to all presumptions, not just to presumptions of ultimate facts and
presumptions against the accused. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, § 201(h) (1973); see
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRImiNAL LAWS, supra note 87, at 3-4.
89 An acceptable alternative would be to place the provisions dealing with civil and
criminal presumptions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure respectively. However, this would entail unnecessary duplication
since criminal presumptions in favor of the accused and civil presumptions presumably
should be treated alike.
. 96 For instance, submission to the jury, when a reasonable juror could find the pre-
sumed fact, might be made mandatory, if the rather slim effect given statutory presump-
19731
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The Supreme Court Draft provision respecting presumptions against
the criminal accused should be amended to delete the distinction between
questions of presumed ultimate fact and questions of presumed mediate
fact.91 Under the rule, the standards for submission of a presumed fact
to the jury92 and for instructing the jury92 depend upon this distinction.
Difficulties in administering this distinction are inevitable, as most judges,
lawyers, and juries will find it difficult to comprehend. Moreover, the
confusing distinction is unnecessary, since the same result as under the
rule would ensue if the ordinary rules governing sufficiency of evidence
and burden of proof were applied to presumptions. The presumption
rule merely should provide for submission to the jury whenever such
would be warranted in the absence of a presumption, and provide for
tions by the Supreme Court Draft is particularly objectionable to Congress. S. 1 as
respects presumptions provides for mandatory submission.
A distinction between statutory standards purporting to define prima facie cases and
those purporting to create presumptions also might be inserted in the Supreme Court
Draft. The Supreme Court Draft treats both as presumptions. In contrast, both S. 1 and'
the Brown Commission Report contain specific provisions prescribing the effect of prima,
fade standards: submission to the jury is not mandatory but only warranted and there
is to be no instruction attributing any special weight to the facts constituting the prima
facie case. An instruction somewhat stronger than that authorized by rule 303(c) of
the Supreme Court Draft would be required in the case of presumptions. See S. 1, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, § 201(h) (1973); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAws, supra note 87, at 4. While introducing unnecessary complexity into the-
trial and appeal of criminal cases, a distinction may accurately reflect congressional in-
tent behind the legislative prescription of prima facie cases.91 See PRoPosED FED. R. Ev. 303 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
2 ld. 303 (b). Ultimate facts are submitted only when a reasonable juror could find the
fact beyond a reasonable doubt; mediate facts are submitted where there is substantial'
evidence. Id. The Advisory Committee may have included the provision to create a
uniform standard regarding motions for judgment of acquittal. At the time the Su-
preme Court Draft was written, three distinct views concerning when it is appropriate
to direct an acquittal were extant in the federal courts. This now may have been re-
duced to two, for the Second Circuit recently has joined the majority position. Compare
United States v. Brown, 436 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1970) (directed acquittal when reason-
able juror could not find prosecution's case proved beyond a reasonable doubt; majority
view) 'with United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726
(1944) (directed acquittal when reasonable juror could not find prosecution's case
proved by a preponderance of the evidence), overruled, United States v. Taylor, 464
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972) and 'with Isbell v. United States, 227 F. 788 (8th Cir. 1915)
(directed acquittal when there is no substantial evidence of facts excluding every hy-
pothesis but that of guilt). However, an evidentiary provision should not be used as a
backdoor vehicle of such reform. A more appropriate and effective mandate could be
inserted in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. 11,
§ 201(h) (1973).
93 PRoPosED FED. R. EvD. 303 (c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The jury is in-
structed that presumed ultimate facts cannot be found unless the jury is convinced of
them beyond a reasonable doubt, but presumed mediate facts simply may or may not-
be found, with no specification of the degree of persuasion required. Id.
142,
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a mandatory instructon that the jury "may but need not find the pre-
sumed fact from the evidence which gives rise to the presumption,"
without any indication of the degree to which the jurors must feel con-
vinced-for example, beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance
of the evidence.
IMPEACHMENT
CONVICTIONS
Rule 609 of the Supreme Court Draft provides that, unless stale, prior
convictions of crimes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment
or involving false statements or dishonesty may be used to impeach a
witness, including a criminal defendant.9" The Subcommittee's proposed
amendments would add to the rule a provision empowering the judge,
in his discretion, to bar ordinarily admissible prior convictions if they
are unduly prejudicial when compared to their impeaching value. 5
This veto power should be adopted. It is required to safeguard the rights
of witnesses, particularly if they also are the criminal accused, and to
avoid discouraging witnesses unnecessarily.
Allowing the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness is in accord
with prevailing law, although the type and age of convictions that may
be used varies greatly. 8 The power to exclude such evidence if unduly
prejudicial also has met with acceptance in a significant number of de-
cisions.97 An earlier draft of rule 609 included this judicial veto power,98
but the Advisory Committee finally yielded to the entreaties of "law
and order" advocates and deleted it."" In light of this deletion, it would
04 Id. 609. The rule is fashioned after the District of Columbia Code. See D.C. CoDE §
14-305 (Supp. V, 1972).
95 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 609, supra note 10, at 21-22.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Greely, 471 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1972) (12-year-old robbery
conviction admitted to impeach defendant charged with robbery); United States v.
Tubbs, 461 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1972) (two-year-old and seven-year-old robbery convic-
tions admitted to impeach defendant charged with robbery); United States v. Williams,
445 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1971) (convictions for manslaughter and assault with intent to
1111 admitted to impeach defendant charged with stealing a television).9T See, e.g., United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1968); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C.
'Cir. 1965); People v. Montgomery, 47 111. 2d 510, 515, 268 NE.2d 695, 698 (1971).
9 8 See PaoPosm FED. R. EvID. 609 (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971).
9) Senator McClellan and the Justice Department accused the Advisory Committee
,of ignoring congressional disapproval of the judicial veto power, which Congress in-
tentionally failed to include in its 1970 revision of section 14-305 of the District of
-Colunbia Code. Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 317 (letter from Senator
John McClellan to William Hungate, Feb. 16, 1973); see D.C. CODE § 14-305 (Supp. V,
:1972).
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seem difficult to contend that the judicial veto power still exists in the
Supreme Court Draft by virtue of rule 403, which grants the general
power to bar evidence that is unduly prejudicial in relation to its pro-
bative value.
The absence of a judicial veto power in the Supreme Court Draft will
foster undesirable results. For example, in a case where a defendant
charged with involuntary manslaughter takes the stand, a prior convic-
tion of the same offense may be admitted ostensibly for impeachment
purposes, despite its low probative value on the question of witness
credibility and its high potential for prejudicing consideration of the
merits. 00
The Subcommittee's proposed amendment, while wisely including the
veto power, suffers from ambiguity. The amendment is not clear whether
prior convictions both for crimes punishable by more than one year and
for crimes of false statement and dishonesty are subject to the veto
power.10' Although the Subcommittee Note, in an apparent attempt at
compromise, indicates that only crimes punishable by more than one
year are subject to judicial veto,"0 2 this power should apply to both
categories of prior convictions. In the same manner as prior convictions
for crimes punishable by more than one year, convictions of minor of-
fenses involving false statement or dishonesty can prejudice the merits
of a case while adding little to the question of witness credibility.
Rule 609 (b) of the Supreme Court Draft provides that a prior convic-
tion is barred as stale only if the witness has not been convicted of any
crime withim the 10 years preceding trial. 0 3 Apparently a conviction
occurring in" that 10-year period can render earlier convictions usable,
100 See PROPOSED FED. R. EViD. 403 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Yet a court
would not countenance direct use of a prior conviction to establish the propensity of a
defendant to commit a certain crime. See People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E,
466 (1930).
101 The amendment provides:
[Evidence of a prior conviction] is admissible if, but only if, (1) the crime
involved dishonesty or false statement or (2) the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, unless the judge determines that the danger of unfair preju-
dice outweighs the probative value or the evidence of the conviction.
PROPOSED CHANGES rule 609, supra note 10, at 21. The problem, of course, is whether tho
last clause modifies both the first and the second categories.
102 Id, Subcomm. Note, at 22.
1 0 3 PRoPOSED FED. R. EviD. 609(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). These sweeping
provisions, allowing revival of an otherwise stale conviction by more current convic-
tions, apparently were forced upon the Advisory Committee by "law and order" pro-
ponents. See Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 317 (letter from Senator
John McClellan to William Hungate, Feb. 16, 1973).
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even though the recent crime involves a punishment of less than a year
and does not involve a false statement or dishonesty. Such a rule might
achieve the highly undesirable result of allowing a 40-year-old convic-
tion into evidence merely because the witness was convicted of a minor
offense within the last 10 years. This result is especially troublesome
when the witness is the criminal defendant since the admission of a stale
conviction unjustifiably may prejudice not merely the issue of credibility,
but the merits as well. 104 The proposed amendments laudably would pro-
hibit the use, for impeachment, of any conviction more than 10-years-
old. 05
JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AND OTHER TYPES OF WRONGDOING
The Supreme Court Draft, while generally barring use of prior juve-
nile adjudications, allows their use for impeachment of a witness other
than a criminal defendant if the judge concludes that exceptional cir-
cumstances justify it.'0 8 The Subcommittee's proposed amendments
would limit the use of juvenile adjudications for impeachment to crim-
inal proceedings where the accused is not the witness to be impeached. 0 7
The Subcommittee apparently- made this change under the mistaken
assumption that this is the real intent behind the Supreme Court Draft. 0
However, the Supreme Court Draft clearly intends its rule to apply to
both civil and criminal proceedings, except for the special case of the
criminal-accused witness.'0 Nevertheless, the amendment is a good one,
bringing the rule more into accord with prevailing goals of the juvenile
10 4 See UNDERSrANDING =IE RuLEs,-supra note 13, at 55-63. When coupled with the
manslaughter example above, the result seems totally unconscionable. See also note 105
infra.
105 npOPtsED CmN~rs rule 609(b), supra note 10, at 21. The Supreme Court Dffaft
regards a conviction as having occurred within the 10-year period in any of the follow-'
ing occurred in the 10-year period: final judgment of conviction, release from actual
confinement, or expiration of parole, probation, or the official sentence. PRoPosED Fm. R.
Evm. 609(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The amendments wisely would calculate
the 10-year period from the date of conviction or the date of release from confinement,
whichever is later. PROPOSED CHANGES rule 609(b), supra note 10, at 21.
100 PROPOSED FED. R. Ev-m. 609(d) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
107 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 609, supra note 10, at 22.
108 Id., Subcomm. Note.
109 PROPOSED FED. R. Evw. 609, Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov.
1972). The Supreme Court Draft provides -in part: "The judge may, however, allow
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if ... ." Id. 609.
Use of the word "accused" does not mean the Advisory Committee intended to authorize
the judge's power to permit use only in criminal cases. Rather, that term is meant to
preclude the power in one criminal situation and to affirm it in all other criminal and
civil situations. I . I
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system"0 and with the general policy of avoiding undue embarrassment
or discouragement of witnesses."' In criminal cases, where the necessity
for and probative value of a juvenile record are likely to be greater, these
policies are overridden.
The new amendments would provide needed clarification on the
matter of when wrongdoing, not the subject of a conviction or a juvenile
adjudication, may be used for impeachment. The amendments state ex-
pressly, rather than impliedly as under the Supreme Court Draft, that
inquiry into such wrongdoing (limited in both drafts to cross-examina-
tion) is permissible only in the discretion of the judge." 2 Unfortunately,
remoteness in time is dropped from specific mention as a factor for the
judge to consider, although it may still be implied.
HEARSAY
PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
Under prevailing American law, prior statements of witnesses, if of-
fered as substantive evidence and not coming within some exception to
the hearsay rule, are hearsay and inadmissible. As substantive evidence,
the truthfulness of such prior statements would be relied upon, but the
statements would not have been subject to certain courtroom safeguards
when made, such as cross-examination in the light of current issues, and
hence must be excluded.1 3 The present availability of the witness for
cross-examination is not considered an adequate safeguard; to be ef-
fective, cross-examination must occur when the statement is first made." 4
11o The preservation of confidentiality and the minimization of adverse consequences
from an adjudication are goals of the juvenile system fostered by the limited use of
juvenile records for impeachment purposes. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16, 22-25
(1967); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the juvenile Courts, 67 COLUm. L. REV. 281,
286-89 (1967).
M See McCoRMIcic, supra note 30, § 42, at 83.
112 Compare Paoposm CHnA GEs rule 608(b), supra note 10, at 21 with PRoposED FED.
R. Evm. 608(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
-13 See, e.g., Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 121, 150 N.W.2d 146, 153 (1967); In re
Dalton Estate, 346 Mich. 613, 622, 78 N.W. 2d 266, 271 (1956); State v. Saporen, 205
Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
The majority viewpoint, however, is not without strong dissent among some courts
and commentators. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970); United States
v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964); Jett v. Com-
monwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788, 792 (Ky. 1969); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 240-41, 163
N.W.2d 609, 614 (1969); McComIcc, supra note 30, 55 39, 251; 3A J. WiGmoga, EviENCE
§1018, at 996 n.2 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970).
114 State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
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The Supreme Court Draft, following in some measure the lead of the
new California Evidence Code,"-1 makes an exception to this rule for
certain prior statements, including prior inconsistent statements, and
declares that such statements are not hearsay.:"" The Subcommittee's
proposed amendments wisely would restrict the admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements to those made under oath and subject to penalty
for perjury at a trial, hearing, deposition, or grand jury proceeding. 17
The proposed amendment represents a compromise between the rela-
tively unlimited use of prior inconsistent statements permitted under
the Supreme Court Draft and the prevailing law which totally forbids
substantive use unless the statement qualifies for some regular exception
to the hearsay rule.1"
In criminal trials, the Supreme Court Draft's liberal standard respect-
ing prior inconsistent statements will favor the prosecution, which is
better able to procure such statements and which often must rely on
witnesses who grow increasingly hostile as trial nears. Such a rule may
encourage widespread gathering of prior statements by the Government
and may lead toward trial by affidavit and away from full and effective
confrontation. A witness' obdurate disclaimer of all knowledge concern-
115 See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1235, 1236, 1238 (West 1966).
116 PROPOSED Fa. R. EvrD. 801(d) (1) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The Supreme
Court Draft, in addition to prior inconsistent statements, admits into evidence prior
statements of identification and prior consistent statements offered to rebut an express
or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Id.
117 PROPOSED C[ANcEs rule 801 (d) (1), supra note 10, at 11. Statements before a grand
jury, while not subject to cross-examination, at least are surrounded by some judicial
safeguards. In addition to the oath, these safeguards include the penalty for perjury,'
reliable transcription of and observers to the making of the statement, and the witness'.
realization of the importance of the matter and occasion. These safeguards, when com-
bined with present opportunity for cross-examination, arguably compensate for lack
of actual cross-examination at the making of the statement.
The proposed amendment does not require, however, that the prior hearing or grand
jury proceeding have been in the same case as that in which the evidence is now sought.
to be used. Thus, the witness' motivations, contemplation of stakes, and realization of the
issues may be quite different and present a threat to reliability or accuracy. See United
States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
118 This change probably reflects the influence of then Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly
of the Second Circuit, who voiced his opposition to the permissiveness of. the Supreme
Court Draft respecting prior statements and who formulated the Second Circuit's De
Sisto rule. Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 219-20 (letter from Henry J.
Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Mar. 31, 1970); id. at 246-65 (testimony and'
statement of Chief Judge Friendly); see United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933'
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964) (admission of prior inconsistent statement as
substantive evidence permitted because made under oath). See also United States v.
Briggs, 457 F.2d 908, 910 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ing his prior statement can make effective cross-examination especially
difficult. The decisions of the Supreme Court have shown that the con-
frontation clause furnishes little protection against substantive use of
prior statements." 9 Since analogous dangers are present to a sufficient
degree in civil cases, the amendment should be adopted for civil as well
as criminal cases.
STATEMENT OF RECENT PERCEPTION
Rule 804(b) (2) of the Supreme Court Draft provides an innovative
exception to the hearsay rule. Good faith statements of recent perception
made by a presently unavailable declarant while his memory was clear
are admissible if not made in response to a person interested in a claim
arising out of the event or condition perceived nor made in contempla-
tion of litigation.120 The proposed amendments wisely delete this excep-
tion.
This new exception makes enormous inroads into the ban on hearsay.
In an auto collision case, for example, it allows into evidence a disinter-
ested and unsolicited letter written by an uninvolved bystander to her
mother shortly after the occurence if the bystander is unavailable at
trial. Moreover, the exception would admit the testimony of the mother's
neighbor as to what the mother told the neighbor about the contents
of the letter if the mother also is unavailable and made her statement to
the neighbor without litigation motive shortly after perceiving the let-
ter. 22 While the neighbor's testimony would be double hearsay-there
are two out-of-court declarants whose credibility is at issue-rule 805,
in accord with accepted law, 23 provides that "hearsay within hearsay"
is acceptable if each of the two branches of the hearsay is covered by
an exception to the hearsay rule.12 4 Here each branch would be covered
119 See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Under the Supreme Court Draft, a conviction might be obtained in a case where the
sole "live" evidence consists of witnesses' testimony favorable to the accused, if one
or more of these witnesses made a prior written inconsistent statement embracing the
facts necessary to convict. Hopefully, a court would direct an acquittal on grounds that
on this evidence, a reasonable man must entertain a reasonable doubt concerning guilt.
120 PROPOSED FE. R. Evw. 804(b) (2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
12 1 PRoPosm CArGEs rule 804(b) (2), supra note 10, at 31.
22 One member of the Advisory Committee has indicated that the use of the words
"event or condition" in the rule, rather than the word "fact," to describe what it is that
must be recently perceived, precludes admissibility in this hypothetical case because the
letter, while a fact, is not an event or condition. Interview with Craig Spangenberg,
Member of Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence, in Asheville, N.C., Aug. 25, 1973,
123 See generally McCoamicn, supra note 30, §§ 310, 313.
124 PROPOSED FED. R. EVD. 805 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); accord, PaoPosED
CANGas rule 805, supra note 10, at 32.
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by the new exception for statements of recent perception provided by
rule 804(b) (2).
The proposed deletion of the recent perception exception would not
affect the continued vitality of two other similar hearsay exceptions
which are better supported by precedent. Rule 803 (2), pertaining to
excited utterances, allows admission of statements made about a startling
event or condition while under the stress of excitement caused thereby.125
This exception differs from the recent perception exception in that the
statement must concern a startling occurrence; the time in which the
statement must be made is not measured in terms of "recent" but rather
in duration of excitement; the declarant need not be unavailable; and
the requirements concerning litigation motive are not express. Rule
803 (1), the other similar hearsay exception not affected by the pro-
posed amendment, deals with present sense impressions. 126 This rule is
accepted in fewer jurisdictions2 7 and comes very close to the contro-
versial recent perception exception. The present sense impressions ex-
ception embraces statements recounting an event or condition perceived
contemporaneously with the statement or immediately previously. Con-
temporaneousness supposedly guarantees trustworthiness as excitement
allegedly does under rule 803 (2). The controversial recent perception
exception differs from the present sense impression exception in that the
requisite time period is "recently perceived" rather than perceived con-
temporaneously or immediately previously. Further, the recent percep-
tion exception requires a presently unavailable declarant and an absence
of litigation motive. Thus, deletion of the recent perception exception
will not leave without recourse the litigant who offers a deserving hear-
say statement along these lines.
BUSINESS RECORDS
The hearsay provisions of the Supreme Court Draft would be modi-
fied further by proposed Subcommittee amendments restricting the
business records exception to "business and professional records" 12
125 PROFOS ED. R. Evm. 803(2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). This exception
is accepted nearly everywhere. 6 J. WIGMoRE, EViDENcE, §§ 1746-50 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp.
1972).
326 PRoPosvD FED. R. Evm. 803 (1) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
127 See, e.g., Kelly v. Hanwick, 228 Ala. 336, 153 So. 269 (1934); McCaskill v. State,
227 So. 2d 847 (Miss. 1969); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474
(1942). See generally McCo.Micn, supra note 30, § 298.
12 8 PaopoSD C-ANGES rule 803 (6), supra note 10, at 27. The proposed amendment seems
even narrower than some interpretations of the existing Federal Business Records Act.
28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970), formerly codified in 28 U.S.C. § 695 (1940), construed in Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
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rather than the records of any "regularly conducted activity." 129 Al_
though the Subcommittee rightly may fear that overly broad language
will bring the records of social clubs or small community organizations
within the scope of the exception, their proposed solution would raise
inevitable questions about the inclusion of police, charity, and low-level
government records. Clearly these latter records should qualify if they
possess the same guarantees of trustworthiness that are assumed to inhere
in regular business records. 130 The language of the Supreme Court Draft,
"regularly conducted activity," when read in conjunction with the Ad-
visory Committee commentary and general case law, will eliminate
many unnecessary questions posed by the Subcommittee's proposed lim-
itations while guaranteeing that records excepted from the hearsay rule
do meet high standards of reliability.''
The Federal Business Records Act' should be repealed with the
adoption of the federal evidence rules, to the extent they conflict. At
present, there is no clarification of the relationship between the Rules and
the Act."'3
STATEMENTS AT EARLIER PROCEEDINGS
The common law excepts from the hearsay rule testimony given at
former judicial or quasi-judicial hearings in the same or a different case
if the witness is presently unavailable, the earlier proceeding provided
an opportunity for cross-examination, and if the issues, stakes, and parties
were the same in the earlier proceeding as in the later proceeding.a 4
Strict adherence to these requirements seems to be eroding as courts
begin to realize their purpose: to insure that someone, with at least as
great an interest or motive as the present opponent of the evidence, con-
fronted the evidence in the earlier proceeding.2 5 The Supreme Court
129 PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 803 (6) & (7) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
130 The reliability of such records derives from systematic checking of the records,
regularity and continuity in keeping the records, actual reliance on the records, and a
continuing occupational duty to maintain accurate records. Id. 803(6), Advisory Comm.
Note.
131 See id. An additional difficulty with the proposed amendment is its failure to make
clear that the "regular course" requirement applies to each element of the exception.
132 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
'33 UNDERSTANDiNG THm RULES, supra note 13, at 121-22; see 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970);
note 128 supra.
13 4 See Rio Grande So. Ry. v. Campbell, 55 Colo. 493, 136 P. 68 (1913); Atwood v. At-
wood, 86 Conn. 579, 89 A. 29 (1913). See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1401-18 (3d
ed. 1940).
135 See McCoRMick, supra note 30, §§ 256-58.
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Draft expands this former testimony exception by dispensing with any
express requirement that the issues, stakes, or parties at the two proceed-
ings be comparable.8 6 The Supreme Court Draft instead substitutes a
requirement that someone with a motive and interest similar to that of
the present opponent of the evidence have had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the earlier proceeding.13 7 No distinction is made
between civil and criminal cases.
The proposed amendments require instead that "the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or a predecessor in interest, [have]
had an opportunity to develop the testimony by . . . examination." '88
However, the proposed amendment would not require that the prior
opportunity for cross-examination have been adequate, nor that the issues,
stakes, or the examiner's motive or interest in the earlier proceeding have
been comparable to those in the present proceeding. Thus, a party might
be bound by his own or his predecessor in interest's less-than-vigorous
examination, or by an examination which, although possibly adequate in
the light of the earlier stakes and issues, is inadequate in the light of the
later ones.
This is an area in which a distinction should be made between civil and
criminal cases. The Supreme Court Draft is an excellent formulation for
civil cases, and one which some courts may be approaching anyway. In
civil matters a person frequently is bound by the efforts of another or
of himself in a previous, though somewhat different, case in the interests
of limiting litigation, easing the burden on public coffers, and freeing
judicial resources for dispensing justice to more people.139 But these
interests should not be given priority in criminal cases where they might
result in undeserved criminal stigma and deprivation of personal liberty.
Therefore, the proposed amendment, with an additional requirement
that the prior opportunity to examine must have been adequate, com-
parable, or in excess of the present needs and with the deletion of the
"predecessor in interest" language, should be adopted for criminal cases
where the evidence is to be used against the accused. For civil cases and
136 PopRosED FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Gone also
is the requirement that the party against whom the evidence was offered must be the
same. Id. 804(b) (1), Advisory Comm. Note.
137 Id. 804(b) (1).
138 PRoPosED CaANGEs rule 804(b) (1), supra note 10, at 31.
n9 The law of res judicata and collateral estoppel is an example. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1968) (subsequent history of case consistent); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v.
Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937). See generally F. Javss, Cnvm PROCEDURE
§§ 11.23-.35 (1965).
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for criminal cases where the evidence is to be used against the Govern-
ment, the rule of the Supreme Court Draft is appropriate. 40
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTERESTS
The traditional declaration against interest exception to the hearsay
rule embraces a declarant's out-of-court statements that, in the mind of
the declarant when made, were so far against his pecuniary or proprietary
interest that he probably would not have made the statements had he
believed them untrue.'4' The major issue under the traditional exception
has been the interpretation of "pecuniary or proprietary interest." State-
ments which expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or may
subject him to hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, or have an adverse effect on
a legal claim or defense, generally have fallen outside the definition of
pecuniary or proprietary interest. 142 Nonetheless, some decisions have
recognized these risks as within the exception by liberal construction of
the words "pecuniary or proprietary." 143 The common law has been
uniform, however, in excluding out-of-court statements which expose
the declarant to criminal liability and are offered to exculpate or incul-
pate an accused other than the declarant.144
Both the Supreme Court Draft and the proposed amendments have
expanded significantly the reception of statements exposing the declarant
to a risk of criminal liability. The Supreme Court Draft permits admis-
sion of statements jointly incriminating both the declarant and the ac-
cused if far enough against the declarant's self-interest that trustworthi-
14OThe Supreme Court Draft may accomplish the result recommended here if the
constitutional right of confrontition is held to limit the rule as applied against a crim-
inal defendant. See PRoPosED FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (1), Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme
Court Draft Nov. 1972). Nevertheless, the law should not be located in two places but
rather should be codified clearly in the Rules.
141 See Jefferson, Declaration Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
58 HARv. L. Rxv. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declaration Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. Ray. 451
(1952); Comment, Declarations Against Interest-Rules of Admissibility, 62 Nw. U.L.
REv. 934 (1968).
142 See McCoMvcK, supra note 30, §§ 178-79.
143 See, e.g., Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry, 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915) (ex-
posure to criminal liability); Halvorsen v. Moon & Kerr Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 18, 91
N.W. 28 (1902) (exposure to tort liability for negligence); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo.
282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945) (exposure to shame and possible criminal indictment).
144See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (third party confession ex-
culpating accused inadmissible); Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69
A.2d 436 (1949) (suicide note jointly implicating deceased and accused inadmissible); cf.
Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & F. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844). But see Comment, Declara-
tion Against Penal Interest-A Plea for Parity, 5 TUsA L.J. 302 (1968).
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ness is probable.'45 Embodying a more restrictive rule, the proposed
amendments would render jointly implicating statements inadmissible
on constitutional grounds.146 Both the Supreme Court Draft and the pro-
posed amendments admit singly incriminating statements-those incul-
pating the declarant and by implication exculpating the accused-but
only if sufficiently against interest and corroborated. 14 7 The corrobora-
tion requirement is defined more precisely in the proposed amendment' 4
The proposed amendment's ban on jointly incriminating statements
generally is sound. Bruton v. United States 49 does seem to compel ex-
clusion of certain out-of-court statements which inculpate the accused
as well as the declarant. The unrealiability of such statements may not be
appreciated fully by the jury without cross-examination of the declarant.
However, the language of the amendment seems to exclude all jointly
incriminating statements, made on or off the stand, and needs to be modi-
'45 PaoPosED FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (4) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The decision
as to whether it is so far against self-interest may be complex, because of the hope for
leniency or to share, or relieve oneself partially of guilt. If a statement is both against
interest and self-serving, the traditional rule permits admission of the evidence if the
aspect that is against interest predominates over the self-serving aspect. See, e.g., Massee-
Felton Lumber Co. v. Sirmans, 122 Ga. 297, 50 S.E. 92 (1905); Demassi v. Whitney Trust
& Say. Bank, 176 So. 703 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Small v. Rose, 97 Me. 286, 54 A. 126 (1903).
140 PoPosED CsANs rule 804(b) (4) & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 31-32. The
Subcommittee felt this rule was compelled by Bruton v. United States in which the
Court held that the out-of-court statements of Bruton's non-testifying, codefendant
companion, jointly implicating both, could not be admitted in the trial even though the
jury was instructed to use it only against the maker of the statement. Id. at 32; see
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
147PRoPosED FED. R. Evw. 804(b) (4) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); PRoPosED
CHANGES rule 804(b) (4), supra note 10, at 31.
148 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 804(b) (4), supra note 10, at 31. The Supreme Court Draft
simply said "not admissible unless corroborated." PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (4) (Su-
preme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The amendments state "not admissible unless corroborat-
ing circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The comment
attending the amendment states that this provision was meant 'to indicate that the ac-
cused's own testimony shall not be corroboration. See PROPOSED CHANGES rule 804(b) (4),
Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 32.
The Supreme Court, as a matter of constitutional due process, recently forbade the
exclusion of a rather fully corroborated out-of-court statement of a third party, con-
fessing to the crime and thereby exculpating the accused. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 306 (1973).
Drafts prior to the Supreme Court Draft, like the common law, excluded jointly in-
criminating statements from evidence but, unlike the common law, allowed singly in-
criminating statements on a par with other statements against interest. No corroboration
was required. PROPOSED FED. R. Evso. 804(b) (4) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971); id. (Prelim.
Draft Mar. 1969).
149 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
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fled in this regard.'5 °
The amendment's requirement that singly incriminating statements
exculpating an accused be corroborated should be abandoned. Although
third parties may be motivated to confess by forceful or fraudulent in-
ducements of defense counsel, singly incriminating statements seem as
reliable as any other evidence admitted on behalf of criminal defendants.
The jury is as capable of assessing this evidence as other evidence ad-
mitted pursuant to exceptions to the hearsay rule where the declarant
cannot be cross-examined.j'5
The proposed amendments reject that part of the Supreme Court Draft
which expressly broadens the common law exception to include state-
ments exposing the declarant to civil liability, hatred, ridicule or disgrace,
and statements having adverse effect on legal claims or defenses.1r2 The
Subcommittee apparently believes that these consequences are insuffi-
cient to assure substantial trustworthiness or that a judge or jury will be
unable to distinguish when they are and are not.5 3 However, these
evaluations fall within lay experience. A jury is capable of evaluating,
for example, the relative weight to be accorded statements merely em-
barrassing a declarant and those costing him a large sum of money. In
addition, the rule allows a judge to keep the evidence from the jury if
it is not sufficiently against interest to substantially guarantee trustworthi-
ness. Thus the Supreme Court Draft should be adopted in this respect.
The amendment nevertheless would be acceptable if the Subcommittee
Note made clear that a court may admit statements against these "new"
150 The Subcommittee's proposed amendment provides simply that a jointly incrim-
iating statement "is not admissible." PROPOSED CHANGES rule 804(b) (4), supra note 10,
at 31. One solution would be to change this phrase to "is not included within this ex-
ception" to the hearsay rule. This substitute language embodies what actually was in-
tended and eliminates the problem that, as worded, the amendment would exclude the
statements even if they are within another exception to the hearsay rule or are not hear-
say at all.
A similar problem is involved in the language of the Supreme Court Draft and the
proposed amendment respecting singly incriminating statements offered to exculpate
accused ("is not admissible unless corroborat[ed] ... ).
151 A jury is more sophisticated about the possibilities of private coercion to obtain
such exculpating statements than they are about the analogous governmental pressures
to obtain inculpating statements. Exculpatory statements are no different in this respect
from any other testimony. Even if, they were, free reception of exculpating statements
and not inculpating ones can be justified on the grounds that there is not and never has
been parity between the rules or burdens applicable to the Government and those ap-
plicable to the defense.
162 PR0pOSED CHA GEs rule 804(b) (4) & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 31-32; see
PRoposD FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (4) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
i5a See PROPOSED CANGEs rule 804(b) (4), Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 32.
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interests if they have sufficient adverse effect derivatively on "pecuniary
or proprietary interest." Had the broad exception of the Supreme Court
Draft never been formulated, a court might have felt justified in ad-
mitting relatively reliable statements against the new interests because
of their derivative effect on pecuniary or proprietary interests. However,
a court probably would be reluctant to do so in light of the amendment's
outright rejection of the Supreme Court Draft provision.
DYING DECLARATIONS
Rule 804(b) (3) of the Supreme Court Draft provides a hearsay ex-
ception permitting admission of "a statement made by a declarant while
believing that his death was imminent" if the statement "concern [s] the
cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death." 15
The rule, abandoning the common law restriction to criminal homicide
prosecutions, applies in all kinds of cases. -55 The proposed amendments,
on the other hand, while permitting admission of dying declarations in
all civil cases, limit the exception in criminal cases to homicide prosecu-
tions. 15 6
The assumptions behind admission of dying declarations are subject
to serious question. When a declarant stands "before his Maker" and is
knowingly on his deathbed, does he somehow become a more accurate
perceiver, rememberer, and reporter, and abandon all motivation to lie?
Should the rule be different if the declarant is an atheist? If such a guar-
antee of reliability actually exists,.157 arguably it should extend to any
statement made in that position, whether or not related to the cause or
circumstances of what the declarant perceived as his approaching death.
Any limitation of the dying declaration rule in criminal cases is wel-
come. The amendment wisely would eliminate the rule in most criminal
cases, retaining it only for homicide prosecutions.-158 However, the pro-
posed amendment unfortunately does not limit the exception to state-
1 54 PaoPosED FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (3) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
15 Id., Advisory Comm. Note.
110 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 803 (b) (3), supra note 10, at 31.
157 The theory that dying declarations are especially reliable is at odds with the theory
of the dead man rule, which considers testimony unreliable if it relates to a statement
made by someone who has died. The dead man rule excludes such testimony because it
cannot be tested. See McComvicK, supra note 30, § 65.
158 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 803(b) (3), supra note 10, at 31. However, the Subcommit-
tee's argument that a special need exists for dying declarations in homicide cases is
specious. See id. rule 804(b) (2), Subcomm. Note, at 32. A dying declaration may be an
essential piece of circumstantial evidence in a criminal case other than a homicide prosecu-
tion and may be superfluous or collateral in some homicide prosecutions.
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ments about the very death at issue in the prosecution as did the common
law. 1'59
THE "CATCH-ALL"' EXCEPTION
The seemingly most revolutionary, yet in actuality most traditional,
hearsay provisions of the Supreme Court Draft, are those that authorize
the court to make new exceptions to the hearsay rule for evidence com-
parable in trustworthiness to evidence admitted under other exceptions
specifically codified in the Rules.10 The proposed amendments unwisely
delete this authorization. 161 If the common law courts had been deprived
of this power to create exceptions, none of the present exceptions to the
hearsay rule would have evolved1oa Inflexible codification of the hear-
say exceptions in the Rules would freeze the contours of the hearsay rule
and necessitate formal amendment for growth.08 Yet new rules in the
area can be evolved sensibly only through case-by-case judicial accretion
and development. Compared with the inroads into the hearsay rule pro-
posed or already made in England," 4 the Supreme Court Draft is quite
moderate.
The Subcommittee's reasons for deleting the "catch-all" exceptions
probably include fear of "adjudication without law," unpredictability,
difficulty in preparing and evaluating a case, lack of uniformity, forum
shopping, abandonment of the values inherent in the hearsay rule, and
lack of congressional control. Admittedly, a power appearing in a codifi-
cation is more likely to be liberally used than one implicit in antiquity,
and thus is more open to these charges. An express exhortation that the
159 Contrary to the common law, which requires that a declarant have died as a result
of the injury that was the subject of the declaration, the proposed amendments require
only that the declarant be "unavailable." Compare id. rule 804(b) (2), at 31 with Mc-
Co micK, supra note 30, S 283. Dying declarations about the very death at issue arguably
constitute the most compelling case of need.
160 PROPOSm FEo. R. Evm. 803 (24), 804(b) (6) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
161 PROPosED CHANGES rule 803, supra note 10, at 30; id. rule 804(b), at 31.
1,2 The power to develop new exceptions to the hearsay rule has been recognized
more recently. See, e.g, Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Letendre v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518, 236 N.E.2d 467, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1968).
L63 PROPOSED CHANGES, supra note 10, at 39-40. Under the Subcommittee's proposal, the
Supreme Court would have the power to prescribe amendments, but the amendments
would have to be reported to Congress to tace effect after 180 days if neither house
of Congress disapproves. Id.
114 In England, fairly liberal rules of admissibility, including a notice requirement,
have been adopted for civil cases and proposed for criminal cases. (ENuLis-) CML
EvmENcE Acr 1968, c. 64, H3 2-4, 8; (PRoPosED) CRiMNAL EVIDENCE Acr 1972, §§ 31, 32.
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power is to be used sparingly, or only in the most compelling of cases,
might render the Supreme Court Draft more acceptable.
Although the confrontation clause surely overrides, or is implicit in
the "catch-all" exception of the Supreme Court Draft, 1 5 greater solici-
tude should be provided for the criminal accused's right to confrontation
than the Constitution demands. 6" The rule expressly should alert judges
and practitioners to the special considerations which demand extra cau-
tion in admitting hearsay evidence against criminal defendants.
Additionally, the "catch-all" exception of the Supreme Court Draft
should require that evidence be comparably necessary to that admitted
under the other exceptions as well as comparably trustworthy. As a safe-
guard against uncontrolled use of the exception, written findings by the
judge on the need for and trustworthiness of the evidence should be re-
quired.1 7 Moreover, the rule should require pretrial notice of intent to
invoke the exception, including particulars about the statement and the
identity and residence of the declarant, to enable the other side to bring
forward the declarant, or facts concerning the declarant, for purposes of
examining the credibility of the declarant's statement. 68
DEFINITION OF UNAVAILABILITY
In general conformity with traditional law, five of the hearsay excep-
tions in the Supreme Court Draft require that the declarant be unavail-
able to testify.0 9 The Supreme Court Draft's definition of unavailability
includes the situation in which "the proponent of [a declarant's] state-
ment has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other rea-
sonable means." 170 The Subcommittee, by inserting "or testimony" after
the word "attendance," purports to render a declarant "available" if hd
165 See U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI; Note, Confrontation and tbe Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE
L. 1434 (1966).
10 At any rate, all the law on the matter should be in one place to avoid misleading
impressions and to avoid placing too much emphasis on assiduous research and on
specialization, especially when many counsel are appointed from noncriminal practices.
10 7 Cf. Recommendation of District of. Columbia Committee with Respect to Article
VIII Federal Rules of Evidence, pp. 11-12.
108 An absent declarant may be impeached as though he testified in person. See PRO-
POSED FED. R. EviD. 806 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Although the civil discovery
rules occasionally may be adequate to provide the information necessary for effective
impeachment, the limited criminal discovery rules probably are not. Compare FED. R.
Civ. P. 26-37 'with FED. R. Cim. P. 15-16.
109 PaoPosED FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (1)-(5) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (former
testimony, statement of recent perception, statement under belief of impending death,
statement against interest, statement of personal or- family history); see McCORMq;,
supra note 30, § 253.
170 PaoPosED FED. R. Evm. 804(a) (5) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
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has been deposed on the matter sought to be introduced or if a reason-
able opportunity to depose him has been foregone. 71 This insertion raises
questions concerning what the new words embrace in addition to a depo-
sition in the same case. For example, do they encompass testimony at
other judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceedings; affidavits;
unsworn statements; statements before grand juries; or depositions in
other cases? If they apply to depositions in other cases, a logical conflict
exists with rule 804 (b) (1) which provides a hearsay exception for former
testimony, including depositions in other cases, but requires unavailabil-
ity.1 7 2 Moreover, why should the duty to depose apply only to situations
where the declarant's unavailability is predicated upon "inability to pro-
cure his attendance by reasonable means" and not to situations falling
within other definitions of unavailability? 17 If applicable to the state-
ments of all allegedly unavailable declarants, a rule of preference for dep-
ositions taken in the same case over other forms of hearsay, is probably
salutary. However, such a rule should not apply in small cases where
the expense of taking depositions is prohibitive. 7 '
SCOPE OF CROSS-ExAmIfNATIoN
The Supreme Court Draft rejects the "restrictive" scope of cross-
examination rule traditionally followed by the federal courts7 " in favor
of the "wide open" rule that now prevails in a number of states.170 Un-
171 PRoposmD CHANGsS rule 804(a) (5) & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 30, 32. No
other changes in the definition of unavailability are contemplated by the amendments.
172 See id. rule 804(b) (1), at 31.
173 Other definitions of unavailability include, for example, death before trial and
illness at the time of trial. See id. rule 804(a) (4), at 30.
174 Provision should be made for the exercise of judicial discretion on this matter,
and upon proper application, the matter might be decided in advance of trial.
175 See, e.g., Philadelphia & T.R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448 (1840); United
States v. Fontana, 231 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1956); Branch v. United States, 171 F.2d 337
(D.C. Cir. 1948).
176 PRoPosED FED. R. EvID. 611(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); see, e.g., State v.
Domino, 234 La. 950, 962, 102 So.2d 227, 231 (1958); Rush v. State, 254 Miss. 641, 654, 182
So.2d 214, 219 (1966); State v. Husklins, 209 N.C. 727, 728, 184 S.E. 480, 481 (1936).
However, the restrictive view is the majority rule among American jurisdictions, al-
though there is considerable variation as to how the rule should be interpreted and ap-
plied. See, e.g., Carey v. Oakland, 44 Cal. App. 2d 503, 112 P.2d 714 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941)
(witnesses who testified about incident, but not about conversations, could not be cross-
examined as to such conversations); State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 145 A. 761 (1929)
(doctor who gave general description of wound could not be asked his opinion of the
gun's distance from victim on cross-examination); Nagel v. McDermott, 138 Wash. 536,
244 P. 977 (1926) (witness who testified only about collision could not be cross-examined
as to speed before collision). See generally Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused,
52 CoaRNau.L.Q. 705 (1967).
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der the wide open rule, any admissible evidence within the knowledge
of a witness may be adduced upon cross-examination. 177 The proposed
amendments, however, would reinstate the restrictive rule. 7 8
Under this restrictive rule, cross-examination is limited to matters
opened up on direct examination, except in the case of cross-examination
directed at impeaching the witness. The cross-examining party who
wishes to adduce evidence on a substantive subject not explored on di-
rect examination, must do so when it is his turn to introduce evidence.
The restrictive rule engenders disputes since it is without objective
standards and is subject to varying interpretations. In addition, to ad-
minister the restrictive rule properly, a court must undertake the difficult
task of ascertaining in advance where a line of cross-examination is head-
ing, a determination that can neutralize some of the value of cross-exam-
ination which depends in considerable measure on surprise. On the other
hand, the restrictive rule encourages orderly proof and allows a party
to control his own case. On balance, the restrictive rule appears prefer-
able and should be adopted. 79
Neither the Supreme Court Draft nor the traditional federal rule codi-
fied in the proposed amendment is inflexible. Rule 611 (b) of the Supreme
Court Draft allows the judge to deviate from the wide open view if, in
his discretion, the "interests of justice" so require.18 0 Under the proposed
amendment, the judge, in a similar exercise of discretion, may deviate
from the restrictive rule and broaden the scope of cross-examination.'"'
Both proposals place the burden of persuasion on the party seeking to
invoke the judge's discretion to deviate from the norm. This burden is
177 See McCoRmicK, supra note 30, § 21.
1 78 PROPOSED CHmAGEs rule 611, supra note 10, at 22.
179 The restrictive rule can make a considerable difference in several situations. (1) If
the prosecution during cross-examination cannot adduce evidence known solely to the ac,
cused, such evidence may never be adduced since the privilege against self-incrimination
may prevent the prosecution from calling the accused to the stand. See Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304 (1900); United
States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968). See generally 8 J. WMORp,
EVIDENCE §§ 2250, 2252 (3d ed. 1940); Carlson supra note 176, at 710-17. (2) A party may
avoid certain legal disadvantages by using cross-examination rather than direct examina-
tion to adduce a piece of evidence. See Vondrashek v. Dignan, 200 Minn. 530, 274 N.W.
609 (1937) (cannot impeach one's own witness); In re Estate of Rogan, 404 Pa. 205, 171
A.2d 177 (1961) (leading questions allowed on cross, not on direct) But cf. State v.
Murphy, 216 S.C. 44, 56 S.E.2d 736 (1949) (when cross-examiner exceeds scope of
cross-examination, witness is his and may not be impeached). (3) Psychologically a party
is identified with a witness if he calls him.
180 PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 611(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
181 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 611(b), supra note 10, at 23; see United States v. Taylor, 312
F.2d 159, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1963); Urling v. Fink, 141 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1944).
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considerably more onerous under the Supreme Court Draft because the
party seeking to limit the scope of cross-examination may not know in
advance the direction the cross-examiner seeks to take, but nonetheless
must argue that his objection to a line of questioning should be sus-
tained. Under the proposed amendment, the party seeking an exercise
of discretion asks that the scope of cross-examination be broadened to
allow his own line of questioning, which is an easier argument to make.
The Supreme Court Draft does not state whether, when the scope of
cross-examination exceeds that of direct, a witness should be treated as
the cross-examiner's own witness or as the opponent's witness. This dis-
tinction, while no longer important for the purposes of the right to im-
peach the witness,'1 2 still may have vitality for purposes of determining
the right to ask leading questions.18 3 The scope of cross-examination rule
of the Supreme Court Draft creates another difficulty for the prosecution
in criminal cases and plaintiffs in civil cases, both of whom frequently
must rely in their cases-in-chief on essentially unfriendly witnesses to
establish some essential although limited points. Wide open cross-exam-
ination affords defense counsel a broad opportunity to introduce favor-
able affirmative evidence during the other party's case-in-chief, and
probably to do so through leading questions. Because such evidence may
appear more favorable to the defense than if presented later in the con-
text of the defendant's own case, defendants may increase their chances
of obtaining an undeserved directed verdict. The problem can be ameli-
orated somewhat, perhaps, by requiring a defendant who cross-examines
beyond the scope of direct, to wait until the close of all the evidence be-
fore moving for a directed verdict.'84
182 Rule 607 removes restrictions on the right of a party to impeach his own witness.
PaoPosED FED. R. EvID. 607. (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); accord PROPOSED CHANGES
rule 607, supra note 10, at 20.
183 PaOPOSED FED. R. EviD. 611(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (leading questions
ordinarily allowed on cross, not ordinarily on direct). In some jurisdictions, where a
cross-examiner exceeds the scope of the direct examination in a substantive inquiry, the
witness to that extent becomes the cross-examiner's own witness for purposes of the
right to impeach or aslc leading questions. See People ex rel. Phelps v. Court, 83 N.Y. 436,
459-60 (1881); State v. Hickman, 77 Ohio App. 479, 486-87, 67 N.E.2d 815, 818-19 (1945).
Since rule 611(c) prescribes only what ordinarily is to be allowed or disallowed, the
net result probably will be that the judge has discretion in allowing leading questions
when the scope of direct is exceeded. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 611(c) (Supreme Court
Draft Nov. 1972). See also id. 611(a).
184 Some federal courts have held the introduction of documents by defense counsel
during the prosecution's case-in-chief to constitute waiver of the right to request a di-
rected verdict of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court
Draft is silent concerning whether cross-examination by defense counsel beyond the
scope of direct is to be treated in the same fashion as defense counsel's introduction of
documents. Another unanswered question is whether, assuming a motion at the close
[Vol. 62:125
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The Supreme Court Draft does not eliminate disputes over whether
a particular matter was opened up on direct, although theoretically this
issue is irrelevant under a wide open cross-examination rule. The right
to use leading questions on cross-examination and the right to move for
a directed verdict after the initial case-in-chief may depend upon
such a determination. Moreover, the judge must consider this question
in exercising his discretion to confine the inquiry on cross-examination.
Thus, far from eliminating disputes, the Supreme Court Draft engenders
some for which existing federal law provides little guidance.8 5
JuDicuL NoTicE
The Supreme Court Draft's rule respecting judicial notice of fact ex-
pressly applies only to judicial notice of adjudicative fact whereas the
proposed amendments would permit judicial notice of both legislative
and adjudicative fact' 6 Although the distinction between these two
types of fact often may be elusive,'17 the basic difference is illustrated
easily.' SS In determining whether a particular criminal act alleged to
have transpired at the Empire State Building is within the geographic
jurisdiction covered by the New York courts, a court might take judicial
notice of the adjudicative fact that the Empire State Building is in New
York.8 " On the other hand, in determining whether a husband-wife
of the plaintiff's or prosecution's case is permitted, the evidence is to be assessed without
reference to material brought out on cross by defendant that exceeded the scope of the
direct.
188 In addition, the draft raises questions as to what factors the judge is to consider
when asked to exercise his discretion under rule 611 (b) to confine cross-examination,
or under rule 611 (c) to allow or disallow leading questions when cross-examination ex-
ceeds the scope of direct.
186PRoPosm FED. R. EviD. 201 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); PRoPosED CHANGES
rule 201 & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 7-8. The Supreme Court Draft leaves to
existing law judicial notice of law and of facts that are not "adjudicative" PRoPosED Fzn.
R. Evm. 201 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
187 See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohylich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948) (title of
"Seventeen" magazine acquired secondary meaning).
188 [A]djudicative facts are those ... that normally go to the jury .... They
relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses. Legisla-
tive facts... help the tribunal determine the content of law and ... policy
and help the tribunal to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining
what course of action to take . . . [Flindings or assumptions of legislative
facts need not be, frequently are not, and sometimes cannot be supported by
evidence.
2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATwE LAW TaRAnsE S 15.03, at 353 (1958). See also Davis, Judicial
Notice, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 513 (1969).
189 See Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), reappealed, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962) (judicial notice of Mississippi's school segregation
policy); Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 P. 223 (1919) (judicial notice that a certain two-
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privilege should be extended to cover a situation where the communi-
cating spouse has died by the time of trial, a court may base its decision
on judicial notice of legislative fact.190
Judicial notice of legislative fact is inherent in the judgment which a
judge is called upon to exercise daily.'91 Although it may make con-
siderable sense to require some kind of indisputability before a court
may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts, it would be antithetical to
the process of exercising judgment to require indisputability respecting
whether a particular privilege rule would promote or discourage or not
affect communication. 92
The Supreme Court Draft's rule on judicial notice requires that before
a fact can be judicially noticed, it must be a fact that is "not subject to
reasonable dispute" either because it is "generally known within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction!' or "capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be ques-
tioned." "' Applying these standards to judicial notice of adjudicative
fact is a sound policy. However, the Subcommittee's proposed amend-
ments would extend the Supreme Court Draft's rule to legislative facts
as well'94 and would create a rule impossible of administration and, if
literally applied, totally destructive of our judicial system. The amend-
ments show a basic misconception of the judicial function and a simplis-
tic belief that nothing even resembling a legislative function should be
block area in San Francisco was in a business district). But see Reinert v. Superior Ct.,
2 Cal. App. 3d 36, 82 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (physical symptoms of thick
speech and dilated eyes not judicially noticed as evidence of drugged state).
190 The court may decide (1) that the purpose of the spousal privilege is to encourage
communications between husband and wife; (2) that such encouragement is normally
marginal at best; (3) that parties, when communicating, usually are not thinking about
possible disclosure should they die; and (4) even if they did think about this, they
ordinarily would not be too concerned about after-death disclosure. The court, there-
fore, might deny the privilege.
191 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (judicial notice
of factors constituting fairness and unfairness of asserting jurisdiction over business
having minimum contacts with a state); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) (judicial notice of psychiatric theory and the nature of mental illness and
criminal acts as they relate to insanity defense); Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y.
176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921) (judicial notice of foreseeability of rescue attempt).
1.2 A decision either way on the privilege question presented the court in the above
hypothetical case requires acceptance of one or another of the three fact propositions
in the last text clause above, none of which is indisputable. If a judge were to decide the
issue of privilege without regard to these propositions, he would be shirking his respon-
sibility to exercise reasoned judgment. Either the judge must be allowed to take judicial
notice of one or another of these disputable facts, or he must take evidence on them,
Plainly the latter is not always an acceptable solution.
19 3 PoposED FED. R. EvID. 201 (b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
19 4 PROposFD CHA-NGs rule 201, supra note 10, at 7.
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tolerated on the part of a court. Admittedly, as the Subcommittee points
out, the decision as to whether a fact is adjudicative or non-adjudicative
can be difficult and elusive.19 5 Nevertheless, some such distinction is
necessary.196
The proposed amendments additionally would permit evidence and
argument, disputing a judicially noticed fact, to be considered by the trier
of fact. 197 In contrast, the Supreme Court Draft requires that the jury be
instructed to accept a judicially noticed fact as established and does not
permit evidence and argument disputing the fact to be introduced before
the jury.198 The parties have an opportunity to dispute the matter before
the judge prior to his taking final judicial notice,199 which the Subcom-
mittee apparently overlooked in permitting dispute before the trier of
fact.210 The likely consequence of the proposed amendment would be
to render judicial notice a nullity, for it apparently would not foreclose
evidence, would not result in an instruction to the jury, and would have
no express effect on the question of the sufficiency of a case to get to the
jury.
The Supreme Court Draft draws no distinction between civil and crim-
inal cases and thus allows facts in criminal cases to be judicially noticed
against the accused.201 The Advisory Committee seems to have forgotten
here what they recognized in the presumption area-where a right to
trial by jury exists, findings of fact should not be directed against a crim-
inal accused.202 The judicial notice rule in the Supreme Court Draft al-
lows a fact to be judicially noticed and conclusively established against
the accused after a hearing before only the judge.203 With respect to
195 Id., Subcomm. Note, at 8.
100 For reasons similar to those advanced respecting legislative facts, the rule also
must exclude from its coverage, as did the Supreme Court Draft, judicial notice of "non-
evidence" facts used in the evaluation of evidence. See PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 201, Ad-
visory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); notes 188-191 supra and accom-
panying text.
197This would result from the deletion of rule 201(g). PROPOSED C-ANGES rule 201
& Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 7-8.
198 PROPOSED FED. R. Evw. 201 (g) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
100 Id. 201 (e).
200 The proposed amendments would not change rule 201 (e). PRoPosED CHANGEs rule
201 & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 7-8.
201 PRoPosED FED. R. Evm. 201 (g) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
202 See id. 303 (b).
203 Id. 201 (g). Whether allowing directed findings of fact against an accused, either by
presumption or judicial notice, would violate constitutional guarantees of due process and
trial by jury is an open question, except perhaps where the fact is an element of the
crime. See Woolmington v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462; MoDEL
PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); id. § 1.13, Comment, at 108 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955); 6 WmLaAms, Ci uNAsL LAW § 288, at 882-886 (2d ed. 1961).
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criminal cases, the Supreme Court Draft should be amended to allow,
as do the proposed amendments, dispute of a judicially noticed fact be-
fore the jury. Provisions also should be added governing the effect of
judicial notice on the sufficiency of the prosecution's case to go to the
jury and prescribing jury instructions. 2 4
JUDGE'S COMMENT ON WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
At common law and in federal courts, as in a number of state courts
and in England, the judge may indicate to the jury.his own views on the
weight to be ascribed to the evidence, provided he stays within the limits
of judicial propriety and impartiality, and provided he makes clear that
his comments are advisory only.205 In federal courts there has been con-
siderable judicial reluctance to use this power, while in England and in
some of the states it has been exercised somewhat more liberally.200 The
Supreme Court Draft simply states that the judge has this power"'
while the Subcommittee, although apparently intending not to alter the
power as it exists under present law, proposes to delete the express pro-
vision in the Rules, on the theory that the matter is procedural rather
than evidentiary in nature.208
If the eventual result of the proposed amendment is that the deleted
provision is placed in the rules of civil and criminal procedure, the Sub-
committee will have accomplished little. If, on the other hand, the power
is left in its present uncodified state, governed only by decisional or com-
mon law, a salutary result will have been achieved. The power of judi-
cial comment on the weight of the evidence should be available; but, if
it is expressly codified, the tendency may be to use it too liberally, unless
the codification contains some exhortation that the power shall be used
only where the evidence is complicated or difficult to assess.
DocuMErs USED To REFRESH WimEss' RECOLLECrION
The Supreme Court Draft provides, subject to certain qualifications,
that counsel has a right to see and use documents that opposing counsel
204 These provisions should be consistent with the provisions on these matters for pre-
sumptions against the accused. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.205 Vicksburg & M.R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886); H. IKALvEN & H. ZEISEL,
Tim AMERICAN JuRy 420 (1966); A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL An-
mINISTRA-TON 224-29 (1949); Wright, The Invasion of the Jury: Temperature of the War,
27 TEiv. L.Q. 137 (1953).200 See H. KALVEN & H. ZmSEL, supra note 205, at 417-25; cf. A. VANDE-DiLT, supra note
205, at 224-26.
207 PROPosED FED. R. Evm. 105 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
2 0 8 PROPOSED CHANGES rule 105 & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 7.
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has employed to refresh his witness' recollection, whether the documents
are so employed before the witness takes the stand or during his testi-
mony.200 Most authority has denied this right where the witness uses
the document before testifying, although sometimes the matter is made
discretionary with the trial judge.210 The Subcommittee, fearing "fishing
expeditions," 2 1 would amend the Supreme Court Draft to permit exam-
ination of documents used before testifying only where, in the judge's
discretion, such examination is "necessary in the interests of justice." 2=
The amendment seems unwise, as the Supreme Court Draft provides
adequate safeguards against abuses by requiring that the witness actually
have used the document in preparing his testimony and by authorizing
in camera inspection by the judge to excise nongermane matter.2'8
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The Constitution vests the "judicial Power" of the United States over
certain categories of cases, including diversity and federal question, in
the Supreme Court and in the lower courts,214 and gives the Supreme
Court "appellate Jurisdiction" over the lower federal courts.2 15 Arguably
this includes the power to make rules of evidence,210 in which case
Congress might have no authority to deprive the Supreme Court of the
power to promulgate rules of evidence for itself and for the federal
courts of appeals and district courts. Nor might Congress have the power
to prevent the lower courts from making their own evidentiary rulings,
though the lower courts would be subject to Supreme Court rules and
appellate review. Under this theory the Supreme Court Draft could
209 Paoposm FED. R. Evw. 612 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
210 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942); Annot. 7 A.L.R.3d 181, 247-5i
(1966); Annot. 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 562-66 (1962). Contra, 3 J. WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 762 (J.
Chadbourn ed. 1970); Annot. 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 566-69 (1962).
211 Paoosm CHANtcrs rule 612, Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 24.
212 Id. rule 612, at 23.
2 13 PROPosED FED. R. Evm. 612 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). As an additional
safeguard, the rule might provide that if a party fails to comply with an order of exam-
ination, the penalty is limited to striking the witness' testimony or, in an extreme case,
declaring a mistrial. Thus, the party resisting examination could choose to suffer the
penalty and avoid an ordered examination if it is extremely important to his case to
avoid a fishing expedition. Rule 612 of the Supreme Court Draft provides such a ruI6
where the fishing expedition fear is likely to have most merit-when the Government
seeks to avoid examination in a criminal case. In other cases, the judge may enter such
orders as justice may require, penalizing either the recalcitrant party, his case, or, pre-
sumably, his lawyer.
214 U.S. CONST. rt. Im, § 1; cf. id. art. I, § 8, ci. 9.
2 15 Id. art. III, § 2.
216 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 327-29 (1816).
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be made effective without congressional approval despite the enabling
statutes and congressional attempts to amend the Rules.217 However,
this theory of absolute Supreme Court power over rules of evidence is
subject to serious dispute. Congress' ability to restrict the powers seem-
ingly granted to courts by the Constitution has been upheld on a num-
ber of occasions. Specifically Congress' ability to deny federal district
courts jurisdiction over certain cases,21 to restrict their power to grant
certain remedies219 or consider certain issues in a case before them,220
and to curtail Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction 21 has been upheld
on the theory that Congress has express constitutional power to refrain
from creating district courts222 and to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 2a Furthermore, the congressional
power to require legislative approval of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure apparently was accepted when those rules were issued.224 To
217 In this connection it is notable that the Supreme Court Draft makes exceptions
from its provisions for other rules "adopted by the Supreme Court." PROPOSED FED. R.
Evn. 402, 802, 901(b) (10), 902(4), 1101(e) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The pro-
posed amendments would make exceptions only for rules "prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority," purportedly barring unilateral judicial amend-
ment of or deviation from the federal evidence rules. PROPOSED CHANGs rule 402 & Sub-
comm. Note, supra note 10, at 9; id. rule 802, at 27; id. rule 901(b) (10), at 34; id. rule
902(4), at 35; id. rule 1101(e), at 38. Of course, the courts still could act unilaterally in
an area not covered by the Rules-for example, impeachment by bias. See generally
Schmertz & Czapanskiy, supra note 14.
21 8 See 50 U.S.C. § 460(b) (3) (1970) (barring preinduction judicial review of selective
service classification decisions), upheld in Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per
curiam) and in Clark v. Gabriel, supra at 259-60 (Douglas, J., concurring); Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 79, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) (barring action
by assignee on promissory note where lack of diversity would have precluded suit by
assignor), upheld in Turner v. Bank of N. America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7, 10 & n.(a), 11
(1799).
219 See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) (restricting injunctive relief
in labor disputes), upheld in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938).
See generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 -ARv. L. REv. 1362, 1366-70 (1953).
220 In Yakus v. United States an alternative procedure was provided by Congress for
challenging the issue; otherwise, the Court might have found a violation of due process.
See 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944).
221 An example is appeals of habeas corpus petitions. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1869); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 307, 314
(1810). But see Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). See also Luckenback S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 533 (1926) (review of, fact
decisions of Court of Claims precluded); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847)
(review of diversity action precluded because statutory monetary minimum not met).
222 U.S. CoNsr. art. Ill, § 1.
22a Id. § 2.
22 4 See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935);
Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United
States, 32 MicH. L. REv. 1116 (1934). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). The questions
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distinguish the rules of evidence from this precedent, one would have to
assume that evidentiary matters are more central to the judicial func-
tion.225
Thus, as a general matter, the congressional suspension of, and pro-
posed amendments to, the Supreme Court Draft probably are constitu-
tionally permissible. Nevertheless, where Congress attempts to interfere
with the essence of the judicial function, as under the proposed amend-
ments concerning judicial notice, or to require adjudication according
to evidentiary rules deemed by the courts to be unjust, as may occur
under the proposal to freeze the hearsay exceptions, or if certain pre-
sumption proposals are made,220 Congress well may be infringing the
in the literature and the cases, both before and after adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, have been whether any agency of the federal government has rule mak-
ing power and whether Congress itself should prescribe rules or delegate the power to
the judiciary. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941); Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S.
(9 Pet.) 329, 359 (1835); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 20-50 (1825);
Clark & Moore, supra; Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-
Making, 65 HAiRV. L. REV. 234 (1951); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over
judicial Rule-Making, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958); Sunderland, supra. Evidently only
Professor Wigrnore explicitly questioned whether congressional authority was needed
for issuing the rules. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. Rv. 276 (1928). See generally Medalie, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 4 LAw. GUImD R'v. 1 (1944); Pound, The Rule Making Power of
the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
225Some federal judges have referred to legitimate congressional authority in evi-
dentiary matters but do not state clearly where legislative authority gives way to judi-
cial. See Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292, 294 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1963) ("special com-
petency of the legislature" in evidence matters but only to point where it begins to
infringe "the Judiciary's prerogative"); Order, supra note 7, at 185 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (rules should be left for "case-by-case development by the courts or by Congress,"
but "the task [is] essentially a judicial one.")
Traditionally it has been assumed that state legislatures have wide competence in the
area of evidence. See Letendre v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518, 525, 236
N.E.2d 467, 471, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183, 189 (1968); Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 341,
200 N.E.2d 550, 554, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (1964) (Fuld, J., concurring); CAL. EVID. CODE
(West 1966); D.C. CODE ANN. H 14-101 to -309 (1967 & Supp V, 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-401 to -470 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §§ 1-101 (1957); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-263 to -329. But cf. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 24 A.2d 406 (1950) (legisla-
tures have no competence to make procedural rules; particular constitutional provision).
Two cases ascribing to Congress authority to make evidence rules are more concerned
with the propriety of rule making than with the proper locus for that authority. Mobile,
J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (dictum) (presumptions); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893) (witness competency); see note 224 supra.
226 This may also be the case if other branches of government have indeed "forced"
the Advisory Committee (an arm of the judicial branch) to abandon the convictions
veto power. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text. Some courts have indicated
that there may be constitutional difficulty with such action. See Dixon v. United States,
287 A.2d 89 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971);
People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
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constitutional grant of judicial power and appellate jurisdiction . 2 7 This
could be true whether or not the particular adjudication is one which is
so unreasonable vis-a-vis an individual as to violate his right to due
process.
2 27 Any sensible reading of the congressional constitutional power to male exceptions
to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must add the implied phrase "ex-
ceptions consistent with basic functions and purposes prescribed by the Constitution."
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APPENDIX
The following materials cite or discuss the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
CASES
Rule 104.
United States v. Glenn, 473 F2d 191, 196 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (Robinson,
J., dissenting)
Howard v. Sigler, 454 F.2d 115, 118-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972)
United States v. Branker, 418 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1969)
Rule 301.
Psatz v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.11 (3d Cir. 1971)
United States v. Jones, 418 F.2d 818, 822 n.3 (8th Cir. 1969)
Rule 401.
Hull v. United States, 404 U.S. 893, 896 n.5 (1971) (mem.) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972)-
United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1203 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert..denied, 400 U.S. 834
(1970)
Rule 403.
Olin-Matheison Chem. Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.'Co., 438 F.2d 833, 838-39 (6th Cir.
1971)
Rule 404.
United States v. Plante, 472 F.2d 829, 831 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973)
United States v. Brown, 453 F.2d 101, 111 (8th Cir.) (Bright, J., concurring), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 978 (1972)
United States v. Smith, 432 F.2d 1109, 1112 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911
(1971)
United States v. Marine, 413 F.2d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1001
(1970)
Rule 406.
United States v. Sorrell, 473 F.2d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 1973) (Pell, J., dissenting)
Rule 501.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 n.29 (1972)
United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1327 n.6 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 933 (1971)
United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1009 (1970)
Rule 503.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir: 1972)
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. dened, 404 U.S. 958
(1971)
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Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1098 n.12 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971)
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)
Rule 504.
Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank & Co, 451 F.2d 670, 682 n.10 (2d Cir. 1971)
United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1035 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971)
Rule 505.
United States v. Long, 468 F.2d 755, 757 n.2 (8th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1045 n.8 (5th Cit. 1971)
United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 35 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969)
Rule 509.
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1973) (by implication)
Rule 510.
United States v Hurse, 453 F.2d 128, 130 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cit. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting)
Rule 511.
United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1325 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933
(1971)
Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 801 n.26 (D.C. Cit. 1969)
Rule 603.
United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 n.3 (4th Cir. 1969)
Rule 606.
Castleberry v. NRM Corp., 470 F.2d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 1972)
Rule 607.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 n.9 (1973)
Rule 608.
United States v. Sposato, 446 F.2d 779, 781 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971)
Rule 609.
United States v. Malasanos, 472 F.2d 642, 645 & n3 (7th Ci. 1973) (per curiam)
United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257, 262 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc)
United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Ci. 1972) (Kiley, J., concurring)
United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1971)
United States v. McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587, 590 & n.10, 591 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Williams, 445 F.2d 421, 423 n.1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966
(1971)
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United States v. Scarpellino, 431 F.2d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1970)
United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14, 19 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 951
(1971)
United States v. Zubkoff, 416 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1038
(1970)
United States v. Morefield, 411 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 916
(1969)
Rule 611.
United States v. Walker, 449 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
United States v. Dillon, 436 F.2d 1093, 1096 (5th Cir. 1971)
Rule 701.
Burchill v. Kearney-National Corp., 468 F.2d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 1972)
Rule 702.
United States v. Atkins, 473 F.2d 308, 313 (8th Cit.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2751 (1973) -
Rule 703.
United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 954 (1972)
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 420 F.2d 560, 563 n.4 (1st Cir. 1970)
Rule 704.
Bosse v. Ideco Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc, 412 F.2d 567, 570 n.4 (10th Cir. 1969)
Rule 705.
Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195, 1200 n.2, 1201 (8th
Cir. 1969)
Rule 801.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 n.6 (1970)
United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908, 910 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US. 986 (1972)
United States v. Rodrigues, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 n.2 (9th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 590 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971)
United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194, 198 (4th Cit.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); id. at 200 (separate opinion)
United States v. Small, 443 F.2d 497,499 n.7 (3d Cir. 1971)
United States v. Metcalf, 430 F.2d 1197, 1199 (8th Cit. 1970)
United States v. Calarco, 424 F.2d 657, 664 n.2 (2d Cit. 1970) (Dooling, J., dissenting)
United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Ci.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970)
United States v. Cohen, 418 F.2d 68, 70 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969)
Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. v. H.A. Crane & Bro., 417 F.2d 1263, 1270 n.18 (3d Cir.
1969)
Rule 803.
Bair v. American Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740, 744-45 (3d Cir. 1973)
United States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 195 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam); id. at 197
n.15 (Robinson, J., dissenting)
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United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1404 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972)
Ross v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 453 F2d 1199, 1201 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972)
(per curiam)
United States v. Stonehouse, 452 F.2d 455, 459 n.6 (7th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938, 939 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971)
Virgin Islands v. Carr, 451 F.2d 652, 658 (3d Cir. 1971)
United States v. Fountain, 449 F.2d 629, 631 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.. 929
(1972)
Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 972 n.5 (4th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 61 (7th Cir. 1971)
Mitchell v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 430 F.2d 1023, 1028 (2d Cir. 1970)
Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir. 1970)
Leon v. Penn Cent. Co., 428 F.2d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 1970)
United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1969)
United States v. Burruss, 418 F.2d 677, 678-79 (4th Cir. 1969)
Lindheimer v. United Fruit Co., 418 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1969)
Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632, 636 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1057 (1970)
Gaus'sen v. United Fruit Co., 412 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1969); id. at 75 n.1 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring)
Rule 804.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 & n.18 (1973)
United States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 199 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Robinson, J., dissenting)
McDonnell v. United States, 472 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1973)
M.S. Walker, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 470 F.2d 951, 952-53 (1st Cir. 1973)
Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 972 n.5 (4th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134, 1138 n.6 (10th Cir. 1969)
Rule 806.
Itnited States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 195 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
General reference.
United States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 195 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, K.K., 455 F.2d 392, 397 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1972)
United States v. McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587, 590 & n.10, 591 (7th Cir. 1971)
ARTIcLEs
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